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Abstract 	  
New media is seen as having a big impact on the way modern political parties run 
their campaigns during election periods.  
 
This paper focuses on answering the question: How was new media used in the 2014 
South African national election? It does this by creating a context regarding the 
understanding of what new media is, how it is used in politics, and what impact it has 
on electioneering and political campaign strategies. Three case studies, the Obama 
campaign and the 2014 Indian and Brazilian elections, are used to highlight how new 
media has impacted on elections.  
 
This analysis is then framed into a set of criteria for success that is used to measure 
the chosen South African political parties against, to determine whether or not they 
used new media well in the 2014 South African national election. A set of criteria for 
success thus makes it possible to rank and assign points to each party and from those 
points determine whether that party used new media well or poorly. Each party is 
given a score out of 50. 
 
The other 50 points were awarded based on a subjective view regarding the actual use 
of language and focused voter communication on new media platforms, specifically 
Twitter. This was done by looking at the insights garnered from the literature 
regarding electoral campaigning, South Africa’s demographic and geographic 
differences and seeing if the parties analysed in this study employed communication 
strategies to target these voter differences.  
 
This study found that the parties identified, when measured against the set of criteria 
for success that was created and the subjective views of the way in which the parties 
communicated, did not use new media well in the 2014 South African national 
election. They failed in most cases, with the DA being the exception, to build the 
necessary online platforms or to communicate effectively through new media 
platforms. There was also too little focus on addressing voter apathy in the youth and 
there was a lack of targeted communication to specific social groups. Parties also 
failed to present themselves as a viable alternative to voters who did not already 
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Opsomming 
 
Nuwe media het ’n duidelike impak op die manier waarop moderne politieke partye 
en partyleiers hulle verkiesingsveldtogte bestuur.  
 
Hierdie studie fokus daarom op die vraag: Hoe is nuwe media tydens die 2014 Suid-
Afrikaanse nasionale verkiesing gebruik? Dit word gedoen deur konteks te gee aan 
wat nuwe media behels, hoe dit in die moderne politiek gebruik word, en wat die 
impak is wat nuwe media op verkiesings en verkiesingsveldtogte het. Drie 
gevallestudies, die Obama-veldtog, asook die 2014 verkiesings in Indië en Brasilië, 
word gebruik om spesifieke elemente oor die impak wat nuwe media op verkiesings 
het, uit te wys.  
 
Die ontleding word dan gebruik om ’n kriteria-raamwerk te skep waarteen spesifieke 
Suid-Afrikaanse politieke partye se gebruik van sosiale media in die 2014 verkiesing 
gemeet word, om hulle sukses al dan nie daarmee te bepaal. Die sukseskriteria maak 
dit moontlik om politieke partye in ’n rangorde te plaas en punte aan hulle toe te ken. 
Die punte-telling, uit ’n totaal van 50, word dan gebruik om te bepaal waarom die 
partye sukses behaal het, of nie. 
 
Nog 50 punte word toegeken op die basis van ’n subjektiewe oordeel oor 
taalgebruiken aanslag asook geteikende kieserskommunikasie op nuwe media 
platforms, meer spesifiek Twitter. Dit word gedoen deur insigte uit ’n studie van 
relevante literatuur oor die verkiesingveldtog, Suid-Afrika se demografiese en 
geografiese verskille asook om te oordeel of die partye wat in die studie bestudeer 
word kommunikasie strategieë benut het om die verskillende groeperings van kiesers 
te teiken. 
 
Die studie bevind dat die spesifieke partye, gemeet teen die raamwerk vir kriteria vir 
sukses, sowel as die subjektiewe opinie oor taalgebruik en aanslag in kommunikasie, 
hulle sleg van hul taak gekwyt het in die 2014 nasionale verkiesing in Suid-Afrika.  
 
Hulle het in meeste gevalle, met die DA as ’n uitsondering, nie geslaag om die nodige 
digitale-platforms te vestig en om suksesvol deur die nuwe media platforms te 
kommunikeer nie. Hulle het ook nie geslaag om die apatie van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
jeug aan te spreek nie en daar was ’n gebrek aan geteikende en relevante 
kommunikasie met spesifieke sosiale groepe. Die partye het ook nie daarin geslaag 
om die kiesers wat partyloos is, of van party wil verander, ’n beter opsie te bied nie.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
During the past two decades there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
people using new media platforms (blogs, websites, podcasts) and social media 
platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest), which are collectively known as 
“Web 2.0” (Barr, 2014). This growth has impacted directly on the way political 
campaigns are run and how politicians communicate with their electorate (Fulton, 
2013). 
 
The term “Web 2.0” was reportedly coined by Dale Dougherty and Tim O’Reilly in 
collaboration with Media Live International in 2004 when they referred to the second 
generation of Internet-based services that have those key attributes that allow 
openness for collaboration and make a high level of interactivity between users on the 
Internet possible without requiring them to have any programming skills. 
 
The term ‘new media’ is also one that has become popular in contemporary society, 
but it has many definitions and versions, and can be recognised as problematic. For 
the purpose of this study Macnamara’s (2011) definition will be used: 
 
[New media] is used in varying ways along with other terms to denote 
emergent digital media and Internet media. It is a common term in current 
debate and refers to the range of one-to-one and one-to-many communication 
applications operating via the Internet including email, chat rooms, 
newsgroups, websites, blogs, wikis and social networking sites, such as 
YouTube, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter. 
 
The term ‘traditional’ or ‘old’ media is used in this paper to represent newspapers, 
print magazines, radio and television.  
 
This growth in the number of Internet users and consumers of new media led Arianna 
Huffington, the editor-in-chief of The Huffington Post, as quoted in Wired magazine 
after the United States presidential election in 2008 that Barack Obama won, to say: 
“Were it not for the Internet, Barack Obama would not be president. Were it not for 
the Internet, Barack Obama would not have been the nominee” (Schiffman, 2008). 
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The Internet, with the use of new media on it, has become a powerful, unregulated 
platform that has the potential to send a message instantly and reach millions of users 
with it. Because of this power political parties have adapted their communication and 
campaign strategies to acquire as many followers, likes and shares as they can to 
ensure that their campaign messages are amplified by as large a base as possible – 
thus increasing their chances of winning in an election.  
 
This immediacy, from a message being sent to its reaching millions of followers, 
means that there is no pause between error and consequence. A scandal, a betrayal or 
a failure is as quickly spread and shared and can have a dire impact on a politician, a 
party or a government, as seen in the example of the American politician Anthony 
Weiner who sent explicit pictures of himself via his cell phone which went public and 
forced him to resign (Huffington Post Online, 2014).  
 
This reality means that any political party in contemporary politics needs to have not 
only these new media platforms at its disposal but also a very active new media and 
social media strategy in place to ensure that good news is amplified and bad news 
suppressed.  
 
This dramatic shift in parties’ campaign strategies and execution that has been seen in 
the United States (Williams and Gulati, 2008) has also been witnessed in other 
developed countries such as Australia (Barr, 2014 and Macnamara, 2008), as well as 
developing countries, where new and social media are also starting to play, and in 
some cases already play, a pivotal role in politics.  
 
In countries like Brazil, according to bizcommunity.com (Durrant, 2014): 
“Opposition parties are capitalising on the television deficit by making friends on 
Facebook […because] nearly 80% of Brazilians aged 16 to 25 use the Internet at least 
once a week and almost half go online daily.” 
 
In Brazil and India politicians are also taking courses and appointing staff to run 
political campaigns in the same way Obama ran his 2008 campaign. The Washington 
Post reported in April of 2014: “Indian parties are using Obama-style campaign 
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tactics in crucial election” and The Economist in March of 2014, reporting on the 
campaign strategies of the top Brazilian candidates, states that:  
 
[because] politicians now want to harness social networks for their election 
campaigns […] social networks [such as Facebook and Twitter] offer counsel 
on how to ‘do an Obama’, in the words of Emmanuel Evita of Twitter, 
referring to Barack Obama’s astute use of social media in the 2008 
presidential race in the United States (The Economist Online, 2014 and 
Gowen, 2014).  
 
In India over the past few years more than 150 million citizens between the ages of 18 
and 23 have become eligible to vote, making 75% of the voting population under the 
age of 35 (Mallet, 2014 and Mckenzie, 2014). The strong growth in the number of 
eligible voting youth and the massive growth of the online audience in India has led 
the online site, Quartz, to brand the 2014 Indian election the “Twitter election”, a 
term it picked up from Twitter’s India head Rishi Jaitly, who after seeing the massive 
growth in the use of Twitter as a communication platform during the election dubbed 
the 2014 Indian election the “Twitter election” (Merelli, 2014). 
 
The motivation behind politicians’ willingness to use and engage online is not only 
due to their wanting to grow their support bases, but is also because they know that 
the Internet is being used as a tool by many other persons to increase offline 
participation in gatherings such as music events or rallies, or even sometimes riots, 
that have large consequences in the political and social lives of countries: for 
example, the Arab Spring, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the Anonymous 
organisation that regularly acts against companies and people who they believe have 
wronged society.  
 
It is thus undeniable that the Internet, and social media platforms on it, have energised 
and strengthened activism, allowing activists to group together by providing channels 
of communication and tools for quick exchange of ideas, group creation, and protest 
assemblies arrangement.  
 
Wired magazine in January of 2012 ran an article on the riots of 2011 called “#riot – 
how social media fuels social unrest” by Bill Wasik (2011). This extract from their 
timeline illustrates the impact social media has had on the private and public space: 
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January 14:  Tunis, Tunisia – Sustained protests oust president Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali. 
January 25:  Cairo, Egypt – Thousands of demonstrators fill Tahrir Square.  
February 3:  Sana, Yemen – Some 20 000 people gather for a “day of rage”. 
February 14:  Bahrain – Protestors clash with security forces; at least 44 people 
are killed in the ensuing months.  
February 16:  Philadelphia – A “flash” snowball fight turn into a near-riot; 14 
high schoolers are arrested. 
February 17:  Libya – Snipers fire on protestors in what ultimately becomes a 
month-long civil war. 
February 20:  Morocco – Nearly 40 000 people in 57 towns rail against the 
government.  
February 20:  China – The “Jasmine revolution” is quelled when authorities 
throttle cell phone services. 
February 23:  Athens – Up to 100 000 revolt against pay and pension cuts. 
April 16:  Venice Beach, California – A tweet draws a flash mob to the 
boardwalk. Gunfire critically wounds one man, and hundreds flee. 
May 30:  Boston – Responding to Facebook invites, hundreds of kids show 
up at a late-night beach party; a SWAT team is called. 
June 4:  Shaker Heights, Ohio – After calls to action online (“Shakers gone 
shake”), hundreds of teens converge on a fireworks show, 
provoking skirmishes.  
July 15:  Syria – Up to one million people clash with police across the 
country; several are killed.  
August 6:  Tottenham, UK – A march on a police station leads to a night of 
arson and destruction. 
August 7:  Enfield, UK – A message calling on readers to “link up and cause 
havoc” sparks looting in Enfield Town. 
August 9:  Liverpool, UK – “That’s my car on fire,” someone tweets. Several 
other vehicles and buildings are set ablaze as rioting spreads. 
August 15:  San Francisco – Anonymous hacks the Bay Area Rapid Transit’s 
website, calling on protestors to mass; hundreds of participants shut 
down four subway stations. 
September 3:  Israel – At least 300 000 people march nationwide against income 
inequality. 
September 17: New York City – Day one of Occupy Wall Street brings around 
1 000 people to Manhattan’s financial district for a march.  
October 1:  New York City – More than 700 people are arrested attempting to 
cross the Brooklyn Bridge.  
October 6:  Multiple locations, US – Four thousand people assemble in 
Portland, Oregon; occupations continue in Boston, Chicago, and 
San Francisco. 
October 15:  Worldwide – From Tokyo to Zurich, millions protest in 80-plus 
countries during the Global Day of Rage.  
October 20:  Sirte, Libya – After months of fighting, Libya celebrates the death 
of Muammar Qaddafi. 
October 25:  Oakland, California – An Iraq War veteran is critically injured as 
police crack down on an Occupy encampment.  
November 6:  Washington, DC – About 10 000 people surround the White House 
to protest a proposed oil pipeline from Canadian tar sands to US 
refineries.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   5	  
 
The quote from Cameron Bird that ran with this article summarises the events as 
follows: “From January, when a dictator fell in the Middle East, to autumn, when 
protesters settled into American cities, 2011 was a year of marches, mobs and 
omnipresent occupations” (Wasik, 2011).  
 
This article from Wired magazine serves to demonstrate the impact of the Internet and 
new media and the potential they have to influence society: where they can either 
promote an individual’s chance for office, if used effectively, or negatively influence 
the political structure of an entire country. In the paper, Opening Closed Regimes 
(Howard, 2011), the authors write that the evidence gathered regarding the role social 
media played in shaping political debate in the Arab Spring shows that social media 
was heavily used to conduct political conversations. This active online group made it 
possible for them to see that a spike in online revolutionary conversations often 
preceded major events on the ground. The demographic profile of the individuals 
most active on these platforms was young, urban and relatively well educated – and 
many of them were women.  
 
The impact of new media has not only been to amplify the political campaigns and 
messages of political candidates, but also to shine a spotlight on corruption and 
inequality. This means that in the developed world, where Internet penetration is high 
and access to information is seamless, political parties have to become very 
transparent and clear about their message and goals to ensure that they are not burned 
at the stake by their own followers.  
 
Traditional media gives voice to these movements, but the kick-off steps and their 
activity are continued and organised on websites and on social media. Curran states 
that “the Internet is a very effective mode of communication between activists”, 
linking them together, facilitating interaction, and mobilizing them to one place in 
short notice (Curran, 2013:14-15).  
 
This trend towards using new and social media from the electorate as well as from the 
political parties’ side, and especially its use in political campaign strategies, has only 
been implemented in recent elections in the developing countries; and in many 
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countries political parties are still tentative about using new media as a primary 
communication tool. This is mostly due to the audiences’ only recently reaching a 
valuable size and with that a rise in demand to communicate with them.  
 
In the previous national election in 2009 in South Africa, new media did not have a 
strong influence, as Marion Walton (Walton and Donner, 2011) writes: 
 
…[an] analysis of the 2009 elections suggests that these mobile social 
networks did not facilitate political (at least electoral) communication, either 
between counter publics and a local mediatised public sphere or globally with 
other networked publics. They did thus not allow for broader contestation or 
for deliberation. 
 
There has, however, been strong growth in broadband connectivity and access to the 
Internet in South African since 2009 and this study investigates how this growth and 
thus access to a new audience was incorporated into the parties’ campaign strategies 
with the aim of seeing how new media – and specifically the social media platform 
Twitter – was used in the 2014 South African national election. This will help us to 
determine how and what the South African political parties are communicating 
online; whether they are communicating at all; and whether or not they have used new 
media well.  
 
Research Problem  
 
The South African academic and lecturer at the Journalism and Media Studies 
Department at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, Jane Duncan, wrote in the book 
South African Election 2014 (Duncan, 2014:153): 
 
…when it came to using online and social media – which should have given 
the parties space to make their voices heard in an unmediated fashion – the 
tendency was to use these media to broadcast existing electoral messages 
rather than interact with existing potential supporters. 
 
She goes on to explain that many of the political parties that were active in the 2014 
South African national election did not make effective use, if indeed they made any 
use at all, of the power of social media and this resulted in their “reproducing 
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weaknesses from their analogue strategies in their digital strategies too” (Duncan, 
2014:153). 
 
There is, however, very little information available that explains what strategy each 
political party in the 2014 South African national election used. It is thus very 
difficult to determine whether or not the political parties are improving in the way 
they use new media and social media, and why Duncan believes that they used it 
poorly.  
 
This study thus determines to what degree new media and social media were used by 
the main political parties and their candidates in the 2014 South African national 
election, and analyses how these parties and their candidates communicated on these 
platforms and whether this communication was in line with what they were 
communicating on other platforms. Finally, the study identifies who the parties 




The research questions that this study will attempt to answer are the following:  
• How was new media used in the 2014 South African national election? 
Sub-questions supporting this primary research question include the following: 
• Which parties and key role players used new media in the 2014 South African 
election? 
• How was new media used; and at whom was it directed? 
• What is the relationship between South African political parties’ manifestos 
and the content these parties used in their new media platforms? 
• What should political parties in South Africa do to ensure that they have a 
successful new media following? 
 
The existing body of literature about the use of new media in political campaigns is 
used as a base from which a comparison between the parties in the dataset collected 
during the 2014 South African national election is drawn. From that comparison it is 
determined how new media was used.  
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The current body of work on campaigning and the use of new media that is available 
focuses heavily on the developed economies, specifically the United States, and to a 
lesser degree on the developing countries of Brazil and India.  
 
Examining how these countries’ political parties used new media in comparison with 
the methods employed in the 2014 national election in South Africa will give us a 
better understanding of the effectiveness of South Africa’s political party approaches.  
 
Research Design and Methods: Descriptive, Quantitative Study  
 
The overall method applied in this study will be quantitative, looking at the how and 
not the why or the what. The Practice of Social Research (Babbie, 2010:52) breaks 
down the basic procedure for a quantitative study into four steps:  
 
1. The construction of the image of the concept 
2. The specification of dimensions 
3. The selection of observable indicators 
4. Combining the observable indicators and the dataset to answer the research 
question, which in this case is: Was new media used well or not in the 2014 
national election in South Africa?  
 
The first step is the construction of the image of the concept: this is where the 
research question is formulated and the parameters are set to determine how the 
research question will be answered. For this to be done there has to be a set context or 
framework in which to place the concept. The literature study in this paper creates 
that framework from which an understanding can grow of how new media was used 
in other examples in the world, and importantly, why it has become necessary to look 
at how new media is being used during elections.  
 
The second step that is required is the specification of dimensions: this refers to the 
selection of data and the motivation for choosing that specific data. In the case of this 
study the data that forms the base of the argument has been extracted from the online 
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social media platform Twitter. The data was extracted from the Twitter platform for a 
period of four months and two weeks, from 1 February 2014 until 12 May 2014, 
which gave us over one million Twitter messages, tweets, to work with. The data 
harvested was chosen because it possessed one of the pre-defined characteristics. This 
means that before any tweet was saved to the database it was confirmed that the tweet 
adhered to the rules that were set in place.  
 
Three basic rules were set up. The first one was: Does this tweet originate from one of 
our pre-selected political parties? Because the research looked at how new media was 
used during the 2014 South African national election, only the top political parties 
that were on the Twitter platform were selected. They were Agang, which is the new 
political party that was founded by Mamphela Ramphele. The African National 
Congress (ANC), the ruling political party in South Africa. The Congress of the 
People (COPE), which is one of the top news-making opposition parties and which 
was formed before the 1999 election. The Democratic Alliance (DA), the main 
opposition party in South Africa. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which is 
also a new party that was founded by the news-making former ANC Youth Leader, 
Julius Malema. As well as the Patriotic Alliance, a new party that was formed before 
the 2014 election by the well-known businessman, Kenny Kunene.  
 
If the tweet did not fall into the first category it was moved to the second category: 
Does this tweet originate from one of the pre-selected top party leaders? They were 
Helen Zille, the DA’s party leader and the premier of the Western Cape; Julius 
Malema, the EFF party leader; Mosiuoa Lekota, COPE’s party leader; Jacob Zuma, 
the ANC party leader and the president of South Africa; and Mamphela Ramphele, 
the party leader of Agang.  
 
The final category was: Does this tweet mention either by full name, for example, 
Helen Zille; or directly address, for example, @helenzille; or any of the pre-selected 
candidates or parties. If it did the tweet was captured and added to the database.  
 
This means that what the political parties and their top candidates posted is visible; 
also what the members of the public posted about them; as well as what the response 
was from the members of the public to each tweet that was sent. This is possible 
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because of the way the communication in Twitter works, where tweets are 
‘retweeted’. This means the message is shared by any profile on Twitter without 
adding or removing anything from the original tweet; ‘quoted’, which is where the 
person quotes, in full or part, the original tweet and then adds their own words; and 
finally a tweet made a ‘favourite’ by anyone on Twitter. This means that that tweet 
will stay visible as a list of tweets that a person has earmarked as something that they 
want to read again later and has more value personally to the user.  
 
The Twitter platform allows for any member of the public to send out a message, but 
all messages are limited to 140 characters (letter or numbers), and anyone on Twitter 
can read any tweet that is posted. This means that with the right software in place the 
entire Twitter database can be harvested to provide a dataset that is readable and 
trustworthy. The profiles of each of the parties and candidates mentioned above were 
tracked for the four months before the 2014 South African national election and for a 
period of two weeks after the election. The tweets were taken from anyone on 
Twitter, so tweets that originated from outside of South Africa were not excluded. It 
is also important to note that all of the tweets that were collected still have their 
original website links so it is possible to go back to the original tweet to verify that the 
tweets used in this database are real and not altered.  
 
A limitation of this sample is that it does rely heavily on the data that was collected 
through the Twitter platform. This means that there are other places online that could 
present alternative insights and arguments that have not been picked up by this study.  
 
All of the tweets that were not made in English were also disregarded, and they have 
been removed from the study. This could have an impact on the representation of 
some of the parties, but this impact is marginal due to the high volume of English 
tweets that were counted compared to the very low number of other language tweets 
that were collected.  
 
It is important to mention that the reason why Twitter was used is because it has a 
large audience in South African and is the only platform that has a publicly accessible 
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application programming interface (API)1 that can be efficiently mined and accurately 
segmented for a study of this nature. Facebook, for example, does not make its users’ 
information available to be mined in the same way Twitter does. This means that it is 
not possible to extract the same quality or quantity of information as that which has 
been extracted from Twitter. Facebook’s user behaviour is also not as readily 
available to the public. There is no other social media platform with the same 
audience size in South Africa that can be tracked with the same degree of accuracy.  
 
The data was extracted by the data mining company, Fuseware. They used Twitter’s 
API to extract the information into a database. As mentioned above, with the Twitter 
API, Fuseware could gather information by asking Twitter to give us specific data on 
a user by asking questions such as: “When anyone on Twitter tweets @da_news, then 
save the following information on the database: Name of person that sent the tweet, 
the actual tweet they sent, their location if it is defined, the time they sent the tweet, 
was it an organisation or individual, and the gender of the person if it is defined.”  
 
Sentiment analysis was also used, which was also done by Fuseware, where natural 
language algorithms pick up on predefined keywords and combinations of words to 
determine whether the term is overtly negative or positive. If the term did not contain 
a specific marker, such “good”, “bad”, “useless” then it was categorised as neutral. 
Most posts on Twitter are deemed neutral, because they are not actively for or against, 
but rather share a information or facts. They did make use of machine learning 
algorithms to improve the success rate of the semantic algorithms, but even with this, 
these algorithms still needed some work to improve their efficacy. However, for the 
purposes of this study they give us an insight into how the general populace felt 
regarding a topic, political party or person.  
 
The third step that is required for a quantitative study is the selection of observable 
indicators. This means that there has to be a defined framework that can be used as a 
scale to measure the data that was collected. In the case of this study, it measured 
whether new media was well or poorly used in South Africa’s 2014 national election 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In computer programming, an application-programming interface (API) specifies a software component in terms 
of its operations, their inputs and outputs and underlying types. Its main purpose is to define a set of functionalities 
that are independent of their respective implementation, allowing both definition and implementation to vary 
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by looking at how other countries have used new media and distilling a number of 
best practices to compare the dataset against. 
 
The final step that is required is to combine the observable indicators and the dataset 
to determine whether the research question that was formulated was answered. This 
was done in the data analysis chapter in this study where the framework from the 
literature review was used to ascertain whether or not new media was used well in the 




The information that is used in this paper was collected and supplied ethically.  
 
The Twitter data collected for this study was supplied and verified by the data and 
research company Fuseware. Fuseware is a market leader in online media monitoring, 
and provides a precise understanding of the online market, competitive climate and 
consumer insights around digital brands (Reporter, 2014). The data collection that 
Fuseware did was requested by the South African company Media24, to use in a 
business document which was never completed.  
 
The author of this paper was an employee of Media24 and that is how I became aware 
of the dataset. I have since left Media24 to start my own company, but was given 
access to this dataset by Media24 after they decided not to use it in their business plan 
and saw no further use for it. My leaving after being given consent to use the dataset 
has not impacted on their willingness to provide the dataset as a basis for the work in 
this thesis.  
 
I have been given written consent by Media24 as well as Fuseware to make use of this 
dataset and publish the findings publicly.  
 
The use of Twitter information is also covered by Twitter policy documentation 
which every person that joins Twitter has to sign. In this document on their website 
(twitter.com, 2014) they state the following: 
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Tweets, Following, Lists and other Public Information: Our Services are 
primarily designed to help you share information with the world. Most of the 
information you provide us is information you are asking us to make public. 
This includes not only the messages you Tweet and the metadata provided 
with Tweets, such as when you Tweeted, but also the lists you create, the 
people you follow, the Tweets you mark as favorites or Retweet, and many 
other bits of information that result from your use of the Services. We may use 
this information to customize the content we show you, including ads. Our 
default is almost always to make the information you provide public for as 
long as you do not delete it from Twitter, but we generally give you settings to 
make the information more private if you want. Our Services broadly and 
instantly disseminate your public information to a wide range of users, 
customers, and services. For instance, your public user profile information and 
public Tweets are immediately delivered via SMS and our APIs to our 
partners and other third parties, including search engines, developers, and 
publishers that integrate Twitter content into their services, and institutions 
such as universities and public health agencies that analyze the information for 
trends and insights. When you share information or content like photos, 
videos, and links via the Services, you should think carefully about what you 
are making public. 
 
From this it can clearly be seen that all users have given full, public right to the use of 
their names, tweets and any other listed information.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of new media and politics. This chapter 
highlights key authors on the subject, as well as comments and critiques regarding 
new media and politics. This chapter will go on to discuss how new media has 
developed over the past few years and highlight the key discussions surrounding this 
field of study. This chapter will also look at the political science literature around the 
subject of the use of old and new media in electioneering and provide, through the 
case studies from the United States, Brazil and India, a foundation to use to determine 
what success looks like when one examines how new media was used in South 
Africa’s national election in 2014.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at the history of new media in South Africa and elaborates on the use 
of new media in the 2009 national election in South Africa. This will serve as a 
contextual backdrop to Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 analyses and links the discussions of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. This analysis 
will be complemented with inputs and quotes from the data drawn during the 2014 
South African national election. It will also incorporate the political parties’ 
manifestos as an additional source to determine the way in which political parties 
communicate externally.  
 
In Chapter 5 the insights garnered from the case studies and the criteria for successful 
use of new media established in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will be weighed against the 
analysis of how new media was used in the 2014 South Africa national election to 
establish whether the political parties and key political players used new media 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Study  
 
As seen in the introduction to Chapter 1, the research problem states that there is too 
little information regarding how political parties and party leaders used new media in 
the 2014 national election in South Africa. And that in the past few years there has 
been strong growth in the number of people who have access to the Internet and are 
active on social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook; and that this has had an 
impact on the way political parties engage with their electorate during campaign 
periods. This has led us to seek an answer to the research question on how new media 
was used in the 2014 South African national election. 
 
To review the literature available regarding the subject of how new media is being 
used in politics – and specifically elections – this chapter has been divided into six 
clusters. The first cluster examines the chronology of old and new media in general 
and the second cluster analyses how the development of new media has generally 
been looked at in the context of politics and government. The third cluster delves into 
how new media has been discussed in the field of electioneering. Here we highlight 
the role new media has played and how it is being used in electioneering; what the 
literature says regarding its use and how it foresees its use in future campaigns. The 
last three clusters are case studies, where it is asked: How is new media being used 
and what is being said about its use in the cases of the United States, where the 2009 
presidential campaign by Barack Obama will form a large part of the literature; 
Brazil, where the 2014 election is currently (October, 2014) taking place; and India 
where the 2014 election was seen as the first election where new media was used 
successfully.  
 
Finally, this literature study and analysis of how new media was used in the United 
States, Brazil and India gives us a lens through which the data that was gathered can 
be seen with greater clarity and then analysed to determine whether or not new media 
was used successfully in the 2014 national election in South Africa.  	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New Media and Politics 
 
This paper looks at how new media was used in the 2014 South African national 
election. To accurately understand how new media is used in society in a general 
sense there needs to be an understanding of how the dialogue around the topic of new 
media has developed in the field of political science. After that a deeper 
understanding into how new media is being used in the field of electioneering can be 
reached.  
 
The academic Thomas Keenan’s personal interaction with new media, quoted below, 
is a good place to start when the topic of new media’s impact on society in general is 
discussed: 
 
When I explore the web, I follow the cursor, a tangible sign of presence 
implying movement. This motion structures a sense of liveliness, of 
immediacy, of the now. I open up my “personalised” site at MSNBC: via 
“instant” traffic maps (which, the copy tells me, “agree within a minute or 
two” to real time), synopses of “current” weather conditions, and 
individualized news bits, the Web site repeatedly foregrounds its currency, its 
timeliness, its relevance to me. A frequently changing tickertape scroll bar 
updates both headlines and stock quotes, and a flashing target floats on my 
desktop, signalling “breaking news” whenever my PC’s on, whether or not a 
Web browser is open. The numerous polls or surveys that dot MSNBC’s 
electronic landscape (they’re called “live votes”) promise that I can impact 
news in an instant; I get the results right away, no need to wait for the 10 p.m. 
broadcast. Just click. Immediate gratification. (Chun and Keenan, 2006:201) 
 
From this the understanding begins to form that with new media, and the Internet as a 
vehicle through which the new media content is sent and accessed, be that on a 
website or on a social media platform, solutions are being created that address just 
about every need a person can have. These online platforms are also created and 
designed to deliver these solutions, through the online social interaction that people 
have with each other on social media platforms, and spreads them immediately by 
using highly accessible and scalable publishing techniques.  
 
Websites and social media platforms have created a sort of knowledge and 
information democratisation, transforming people who were once only receivers of 
information and content into content producers and creators. The speed and ease with 
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which content is created and shared in today’s world was not a possibility fifteen 
years ago when the web was still a very difficult place to navigate and access was still 
limited.  
 
Bokor (2014), taking from Pavlik and McIntosh (2011:68), explains that this has 
created a fundamental shift in society, moving from old media to new media, where a 
dramatic change has come with how content is received, as opposed to sent: “The 
types of media classified as traditional or old media are analog, where the modulation 
of the sound carrier is analogous to the fluctuations of the sound itself.” 
 
The analogue, a single signal medium of old media, be that print, TV or radio, has 
been taken and made digital, where the way it is received and reviewed by the 
consumer has changed. Yet in many cases the original content creation process is still 
the same. Bokor (2014) goes on to explain: 
 
These [old] media afford a unidirectional model of information flow from the 
producers of the media content to the receiver or audience (which is often 
large, heterogeneous, and anonymous). This one-way communication flow 
constrains the receiver because by their very nature, these media are largely 
centralized and lack facilities by which members of the audience can 
communicate with each other or with the creators/publishers of the media 
content. Examples of these media include print (e.g., newspapers, magazines, 
etc.) and electronic (radio, TV, telegraphy, telephony, movies, facsimile, 
photography, etc.). Jenkins (2008) and Williams (2003) explain that in the age 
of digitized media, the traditional media are moving from their analog base to 
the digital world (using the Internet) for their products to reach a global 
audience; but they still retain much of what makes them traditional. 
 
This move from old media to new media that can be consumed, reviewed, shared and 
interacted with on a global scale is called “Web 2.0”; and this term describes what is 
known as the second generation of the Internet which focuses on the website users’ 
ability to collaborate and share information online. This Web 2.0 is named as such 
because it is the upgrade to the Internet, which brings the Internet to a higher level, 
where information and content are now made plastic and mutable, open-ended and 
infinitely adaptable (Eder, 2012). 
 
The Internet has moved away from being owned by single media companies that drive 
content and information. In a 2006 speech Rupert Murdoch (Chadwick and Howard, 
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2010) reflected on how “Power is moving away from those who own and manage the 
media to a new and demanding generation of consumers – consumers who are better 
educated, unwilling to be led”. P. Eder (2012) writes that, at the beginning of 2009, of 
the 50 most popular websites in the world, when you look at how many people visit 
these websites in a month, 24 were user driven, meaning that the content one could 
consume on them was created by other members of the public, and not editors or 
writers. As Napoli (2008) argues: 
 
The communications dynamics reflected in Web 2.0 (see Mabillot, 2007) 
applications such as YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr are 
increasingly foregrounding an approach to mass communication in which the 
individual audience member operates on nearly equal footing with the more 
traditional institutional communicator. As Benkler (2006) and others have 
demonstrated, the new media environment is one in which the tools of 
participation in public discourse and creative activity are much more widely 
distributed (Beer and Burrows, 2007; Jenkins, 2004; Kendall, 2008; Mabillot, 
2007). Mass communication is now a much more egalitarian process, in which 
the masses can now communicate to the masses (Fonio, et al., 2007).  
 
These are websites such as Wikipedia, which in one year went from 270 articles to 
19 700, all content created and verified by members of the public. The other user-
generated websites are the social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and 
Pinterest, where a user can upload nearly any content he or she wants and have it 
shared with their friends, followers or any member of the public that is interested. 
Social network’s value was first seen in 2003 when a website, Friendster, was 
launched and grew from 800 000 members to over two million members in just two 
months. Eder goes on to explain that of the remaining 26 websites, sixteen were 
merely portal or search sites that link users to other sites, such as Google.com, and 
that only ten of the 50 top websites were what should be considered “one-to-many, 
non-user driven sites such as cnn.com or Microsoft.com” (Eder, 2012).  
 
This change from a web experience that was still unidirectional to the shared open 
platform that was created by Web 2.0 has had a huge impact not only on the media 
world but also on businesses, marketing, and legal practices. Casey and Savastinuk 
(2007) explain: 
 
New business models have sprung from such companies as Flickr, Amazon, 
Netflix, eBay and Apple’s iTunes, and the term Web 2.0 has been used to 
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describe some of these companies and their business models […] companies 
and their Web sites have become more open and interactive, allowing user 
input and customization and adopting a more open attitude toward information 
sharing through the use of application programming interfaces (APIs). 
Content, or information, has become less centralized and isolated.  
 
Music and movies are now purchased through digital channels with millions of 
downloads and sales happening online daily. Creators and consumers of niche content 
have exploded entrepreneurial launches into huge viable markets. The Apple iTunes 
Store has become the world’s largest music retailer, and Netflix has radically changed 
the distribution of rental movies. From online gaming (witness the success of World 
of Warcraft) to gambling, the interactive dynamic works to produce increasingly 
sophisticated and ever more finely tuned content. This new era of unlimited choice is 
expanding demand and challenging original ownership rules (Eder, 2012). 
 
Flew (2008) stated that “as a result of the evolution of new media technologies, 
globalization occurs”. Globalisation is generally explained as “more than expansion 
of activities beyond the boundaries of particular nation states”. Globalisation shortens 
the distance between people all over the world through electronic communication 
(Flew 2008); and Cairncross (1998) expresses this great development as the “death of 
distance”. New media “radically break the connection between physical place and 
social place, making physical location much less significant for our social 
relationships” (Croteau and Hoynes 2003:311). 
 
The writer Castells holds an equally optimistic view on the impact of the Internet on 
government and politics:  
 
The history of life, as I read it, is a series of stable states, punctuated at rare 
intervals by major events that occur with great rapidity and help to establish 
the next stable era… [At] the end of the twentieth century, we are living 
through one of these rare intervals in history. An interval characterised by 
transformation of our ‘material culture’ by the works of a new technological 
paradigm organised around information technologies (Castells 1997:29). 
 
The rise of new media has increased communication between people all over the 
world. It has allowed people to express themselves through blogs, websites, pictures, 
and other user-generated media. 
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Use of new media for political communication has been studied by many scholars and 
organisations including Fallows (2000); Jones (1994, 1997); Livingstone (1999); 
McChesney (1999, 2000); Pool (1983); and Schneider (1996), to name but a few. 
However, the evolution of Web 2.0 Internet applications, rapidly expanding 
broadband, declining cost of personal computers and Internet access, development of 
intelligent search engines which make finding information on the Internet faster and 
easier, and possibly increasing user familiarisation with Internet use, have overtaken 
many findings of most pre-2000 research and even much research conducted in the 
early 2000s. Many of the new media currently in use were ‘invented’ or began to 
achieve widespread use post-2004: for example, YouTube, which was launched in 
February 2005. 
 
It is thus important to note that when the body of literature that exists on the topic of 
new media and its political use is examined, and when we take into account how 
quickly Internet based media, or web media, became an integral part of contemporary 
society and discourse, it is clear that the conversation developed very rapidly over a 
relatively short period of time.  
 
When the origin of the term ‘new media’ is investigated, it is interesting to note that 
by the mid-1990s it had become the de facto term for online content. It first usurped 
the place of “multi-media” in the fields of business and art, and then spread to cover 
all fields.  
 
Chun and Keenan (2006:1) comments: 
 
Unlike its predecessor, the term ‘new media’ was not accommodating in that it 
could be used in traditional media as well as new media terms: it portrayed 
other media as old or dead; it converged rather than multiplied; it did not 
efface itself in favour of a happy if redundant plurality. The singular plurality 
of the phrase stemmed from its negative definition: it was not mass media, 
specifically television. It was fluid, individualized connectivity, a medium to 
distribute control and freedom. Although new media depended heavily on 
computerization, new was not simply ‘digital media’: that is, it was not 
digitized forms of other media (photography, video, text), but rather an 
interactive medium or form of distribution as independent as the information it 
relayed. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   21	  
The term new media, however, only became popular after a conference in 2005 where 
the term “Web 2.0” was used. This conference greatly amplified the attention paid to 
the conversation surrounding the future of e-government and the role social media, 
new media and online communication would play. But this conversation was already 
quite active in smaller circles by 1999 with authors such as Damian Tambini writing a 
well cited paper for the New Media and Society publication New Media and 
Democracy: The Civic Networking Movement, in which he noted a visible move away 
from known traditional media forms such as newspapers, radio and television, 
towards the new media space of the Internet, multimedia and computer-mediated 
communication. This was a big stand to take when the impact of new media and 
digital was still limited. 
 
Tambini (1999) called this movement “the third sphere”. In this sphere, it is explained 
that communication is unbound from the state and from commerce and that this is a 
place where free public deliberation can happen. Tambini also pointed to the rise of 
new independent people creating digital networks by building web pages for local 
businesses and local initiatives as the creation of a separate, removed community that 
could discuss any subject without state restriction or involvement. This new sphere of 
thinking, one that was hard to envisage fourteen years ago, is now a given in modern 
society.  
 
What Tambini was witnessing was the beginning of the web as it is known today, and 
it is important to note that he accurately predicted then that this new form of 
communication would be successful because it supported the human need for social 
interaction, where “we have moved away from a monologue (one to many) into social 
dialogues (many to many)” (Tambini, 1999).  
 
This is a very important insight, from a political perspective, because it touches on the 
reality that the communication strategy that is used by political parties would need to 
change and adapt to fit into this new manner of discourse. Tambini was also correct in 
predicting the success of social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, where the 
communication that is generated is ‘many to many’.  
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The term ‘new media’ is, however, much older than Tambini’s article and has been 
used since the 1960s, where it rose and fell with the dotcom mania, cyberspace, and 
interactive television.  
 
In fact the relation between online communication and politics has been studied by 
several authors: to name a few, Wilhelm (2000), Norris (2001), Bennett and Entman 
(2001), Shane (2004), Hindman (2009), Dahlgren (2001, 2009, 2013), Mossberger et 
al (2012), Coleman and Blumler (2009), who all tried to state the importance and 
limitations of the Internet and attempted to further deepen the understanding of how 
the relation between citizens and political actors would play out in the future.  
 
The main concerns many of these early researchers had when they examined the 
impact the Internet and new media could have on society, was with how citizens’ 
information would be used, what their participation and engagement in political life 
and debate would be, and how the communication between political actors and 
citizens would be managed.  
 
With many of the early researches there was quite a degree of optimism and they 
presented the Internet as a tool that would motivate and deepen the relationship 
between citizens and politicians. This optimism changed, however, as most of the 
later researchers began to focus their attention instead on the loss of control the 
government would have over information, the lack of citizens’ interest in general 
politics, and the remaining inequality of access to the Internet and thus also lack of 
access to political information many users still faced.  
 
Writers such as Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, for example, were much more 
cautious and had a limited set of expectations about the implications of the Internet 
and through it new media.  
 
This is evident in Graham Murdock and Peter Golding’s (1989) work where they 
pointed out that when they looked at what was being developed then, they saw more 
market oriented communication and information systems. This meant for them that 
even though the public would have access to a new and large space where they could 
make more liberated choices about their lives, and exercise control in ways that would 
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be both liberating and empowering, this new liberated space and the promise it held 
would only be realised if commercial forces could be held at bay. This was something 
that Murdock and Golding’s critical perspective, grounded in political economy, 
convincingly argued that it could not foresee as possible.  
 
They believed that the systems that were being developed for the online communities 
would remain in the control of the large corporations and government: meaning that 
even though the consumer would be able to access the data at a much faster pace, the 
quality of the data would always be tainted by the sources that sent it out and owned 
it.  
 
This argument of commercial intervention from Murdock and Golding led writers 
such as William Melody (1989:29) to raise the important question about how one 
would define what is and what is not ‘public interest’ when information societies are 
governed principally by market forces:  
 
…to begin the process of redefining the public interest in the information 
society, it is necessary to return to the essential functions of information and 
communication in modern participatory democracy, that is, to provide 
opportunities for citizens to be informed and to be heard. 
 
Melody argued that in a modern democracy the right of a citizen is to be informed and 
heard, which meant that even if the commercial powers ‘owned’ the information and 
communication on the Internet, they should not be allowed to alter it according to 
their personal benefit, if it negatively affected a citizen’s rights.  
 
This question fell in step with the thinking of the day where the fear was that liable 
third parties such as editors at established media companies would not be responsible 
for controlling new media, and that this could lead to dangerous information being fed 
to the public, which could cause confusion and civil breakdown. 
 
In 1992 Andrew Feenberg wrote:  
 
Individuals who are incorporated into new types of technical networks have 
learned to resist through the net itself in order to influence the powers that 
control it. This is not a contest for wealth or administrative power, but a 
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struggle to subvert the technical practices, procedures, and designs structuring 
everyday life (Feenberg, 1992:319).  
 
His fear was that through this uncontrolled online medium, citizens would be able to 
undermine the authority of the state; and that the state would then become a body that 
would be in opposition to the thinking of the online community and would thus have 
to be undermined.  
 
Melody, Golding, Murdock and Feenberg’s hesitant views on the power of new media 
in information systems and their argument that it would cause an unbalanced feed of 
information that would negatively affect the individual were not, however, shared by 
all. 
 
Guthrie and Dutton’s (1992) analysis of how new media and politics could impact on 
each other serves as an example of how speculative and idealistic many of the claims 
surrounding the power of new media and information systems were. They did, 
however, also argue that the introduction of new communication platforms online, 
called information and communication technologies (ICT), provided no guarantees 
that citizens would have a voice that would be listened to by political authorities. 
Guthrie and Dutton (1996:270) write that:  
 
…the technical features and normative frameworks tied to computer-based 
communication networks could have a systematic influence on the content of 
interpersonal and group communication, which therefore might merit unique 
regulatory approaches.  
 
Guthrie and Dutton thus argued that these new online platforms would be important 
places for communities to engage and interact, but that the government should create 
regulations to ensure that the communication that happened online did not lead to 
anti-governmental movements. In their case studies they indicated that the normative 
framework would inevitably include very different political views that ranged from 
civil libertarian to communitarian, to the views of those advocating protection of 
property rights.  
 
He took the argument further and stated that if these regulations were in place then 
there could be the potential for ‘real world’ democracy to be translated into online 
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democracy, stating that: “…the public should be able to conduct meetings in 
cyberspace in ways that are as civil and democratic as in the real world” (Guthrie and 
Dutton, 1996:288). 
 
From Guthrie and Dutton’s argument about possible regulation to ensure effective 
communication there have been other writers who have also examined the possible 
potential of online democracy and deliberation and suggested that, even without 
regulation or control, the online space created the opportunity for communication 
between the candidates and electorate to develop from a monologue to a dialogue.  
 
One such writer is Stephen Coleman (2005:177) who noted that: “…digitally-
mediated direct representation could provide a basis for a more dialogical and 
deliberative democracy in place of the dialogue of the deaf which tends to 
characterize contemporary political representation”.  
 
Peter Dahlgren (2001, 2005) also saw that the Internet had become a much more open 
and creative place than his predecessors had predicted. This meant that he agreed with 
Coleman on the evolution that would be able to take place regarding deliberation in 
that online space, but that this would only form part of the greater environment.  
 
Dahlgren accurately wrote that even though the Internet could be destabilising for 
some aspects of democracy, the true value would be that the public would now be 
able to debate topics and viewpoints in an open and safe space where any member of 
the public would feel safe to introduce new thoughts and encourage diversity, which 
is a necessary element of any healthy democracy. He drew this insight from the 
growth he had witnessed in online communities such as Facebook and MySpace 
where people were actively sharing and engaging around new ideas and opinions.  
 
Phillips and Young (2009) were equally excited about the possibilities that the 
Internet presented for politics when they wrote: 
 
…success in politics is now highly influenced by the online activities of 
political institutions. On this platform, they can exchange views on the latest 
political developments or hot topics, inviting the public and citizens to 
comment and adhere to their political programs. As a potential way of 
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escaping the “top-down” politics of mass democracy in which political parties 
make policies with low-level participation or citizens’ involvement, the web 
provides means for high differentiation of political information and ideas, and 
(at least) theoretical possibilities of participation and high level of 
involvement in negotiations and feedback between leaders and followers 
(Phillips and Young, 2009:88). 
 
It is clear the conversation regarding new media and the Internet has developed 
considerably over the past ten years, from being quite sceptical at first to very 
optimistic. The reality of how it translated into actual effective communication by 
citizens has been less impressive, however. In the past few years the Internet has been 
used in political campaigns to spread messages, inform and engage voters. But, as 
Chadwick noted in 2009: “…the use of digital network technologies to shape public 
policy is generally met with incredulity by most politicians, public servants, and 
citizens” (Chadwick, 2009:12).  
 
Public interest in politics can be limited (political dealignment) and the online realm 
can be envisaged as a place to “have fun” and to “pass the time” (Curran, 2012:14). It 
has been noted that citizens only become active in politics during campaign periods 
when they believe that their involvement would change the outcome of an election, as 
was seen in the 2008 presidential election in the United States.  
 
Lax also notes that a significant limitation to online involvement is the lack of interest 
of the electors (Lax, 2004:226). Even if they have access to the Internet it does not 
mean that they will spend time engaging in political debate, because most people 
simply do not bother.  
 
As a whole, it is their belief that the Internet has not fundamentally changed the 
nature of political action (Hindman, 2009). It only provides tools that empower 
people to have more direct, constant, and personal participation in the formal political 
process, if they want to. Besides, as Nielsen (2011) also realised, “mundane Internet 
tools” such as Facebook, Twitter, and email are more deeply integrated into 
mobilizing practices in political campaigns than emerging and specialised ones, since 
its ubiquity attests to their importance.  
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The growth of network societies online, where there is access to chat rooms, forums 
and community driven conversation instead of single portals that directed the 
conversation to the masses, means that the scepticism of a controlled information 
society has fallen away in most countries where Internet access is unregulated. The 
reality is that most people are more interested in discussing, sharing and building than 
they are in undermining the existing status quo.  
 
The same also holds true for the impact new media has had on politics, where the fear 
that new media would greatly sway the outcome of an election was put to rest. One 
writer to conclude this was Phil Agre (2002), whose synthesis of research on the 
contribution of network technologies to participation in democratic decision-making 
suggests that they are more likely to amplify existing tendencies and opportunities for 
political action and participation than to give rise to wholly new ones.  
 
This amplification is mostly due to the way the online space is constructed, with most 
individuals spending the greatest amount of their time on social platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and Pinterest and not on political or even media websites. This 
means that the way information is found and consumed has changed dramatically and 
that a new form of content creation has been made possible for the individual. Anyone 
can be active in the content creation process and the user of new media can stop being 
dependent on an info-communication hierarchy, giving them the power to find and 
consume the content that interests them. As producers of online content, the active 
participants become, consequently, leaders of opinion and creators of noise and buzz, 
that is, of word of mouth. 
 
This shift has been away from traditional media, where there was a one-to-many 
experience, to a many-to-many experience, which makes it possible for users to 
contribute to web-content development, rate, collaboration, and distribution, as well 
as to customise web applications. This move has created what can be defined as the 
“participative web” that allows, for instance, for the effective participation of 
common web users and gives a place to user generated content: that is, to content 
made publicly available over the web, created outside professional routines and 
practices, using a variable amount of creativity, and which can be shared among 
Internet users at an increasing speed thanks to broadband availability. Users that 
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create content are motivated by factors that include peer interrelation, the pursuit of 
fame, notoriety, and self-expression. As a consequence, the web is seen as an open 
platform, enriching diversity of opinion and the free flow of information that 
otherwise would not be available to citizens.  
 
This “participatory web” does create a series of tensions in the concept of “public 
sphere”. According to Ingrid Volkmer, “public sphere” is defined as a process 
through which public communication becomes restructured and partly disembedded 
from national political and cultural institutions. This trend of the globalised public 
sphere is not only as a geographical expansion from a nation to worldwide, but also 
changes the relationship between the public, the media and state (Volkmer, 
1999:123). 
 
“Virtual communities” are being established online and transcend geographical 
boundaries, eliminating social restrictions. Howard Rheingold (2000) describes these 
globalised societies as self-defined networks, which resemble what people do in real 
life. 
 
People in virtual communities use words on screens to exchange pleasantries 
and argue, engage in intellectual discourse, conduct commerce, make plans, 
brainstorm, gossip, feud, fall in love, create a little high art and a lot of idle 
talk (Rheingold, 2000).  
 
For Sherry Turkle “making the computer into a second self, finding a soul in the 
machine, can substitute for human relationships” (Holmes, 2005:184). New media has 
the ability to connect like-minded others worldwide. 
 
This change in the way society communicates and shares experiences and content 
means that there now exists a hybrid media model where the traditional channels such 
as newspapers, magazines, TV and radio are amplified on the Internet and vice versa.  
 
The world of political communication, campaigning and mobilisation has also been 
affected by this change. In an attempt to describe the current state of the media 
system, it is observed that there are “interactions between old media and new media, 
and their associated technologies, genres, norms, behaviours, and organizations”. This 
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symbiotic relationship between old and new is called a “hybrid media system”, based 
upon the principles of adaptation and interdependence among actors (Chadwick, 
2009).  
 
The hybrid media system mirrors a new system of communication integrated by 
traditional media and new media. The impact this system can have on democracy and 
civic engagement has increased as new media enhance and expand the potential of 
conventional media. 
 
While being recognised as bringing forth the need to inform about everything with 
transparency and at the right moment, the Internet primarily contributes to the 
availability of a number of extended horizontal channels of communication and an 
immense volume of information, which can be turned into knowledge and lead to 
enhanced freedom of choice, consequently transforming informed consumers into 
more demanding patrons. Nevertheless, and as noted by James Curran, the Internet 
did not give birth to a new economy or to a new kind of politics. The advantaged 
(large companies and political elites) tend to be the most active, and the imbalance is 
reproduced in online activism (Curran, 2012:13-14).  
 
Thus, new media has not fundamentally changed the way individuals consume 
content, or make decisions. It has, however, had a large impact on the way 
communication is created and shared, and this has had a big impact on the way 
modern day politics is understood and run. The biggest impact has been on the way 
political campaigns are executed.  
 
At this point, with a strong understanding of how new media has evolved in a general 
sense and how this has impacted on politics in general, it is important to look at how 
new media has impacted directly and indirectly on elections and electioneering.  
 
Elections and New Media 
 
After the analysis above it is clear why new media has become a topic of interest in 
the political sphere: in general new media has dramatically changed the way media is 
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consumed by the public. This change in the consumption habits of the public has a 
direct impact on one of the most important aspects of a democracy, the election 
period.  
 
This section will briefly look at what the term electioneering means and from that will 
be developed an understanding of how electioneering has changed to adapt to the 
evolving consumption habits of the public due to new media. Three recent case 
studies where elections have been adapted to incorporate the use of new media will be 
used to underline this change. From these case studies and background research on 
electioneering a lens will be constructed through which to clarify our understanding 
of what the successful use of new media during an election looks like. This will be 
done to answer the research question: How was new media used by political parties in 
the 2014 South African national election?  
 
An analysis of elections and new media should begin by stating why the election 
period is vitally important to any democracy. Swanson and Mancini (1996) write: 
 
Election campaigns are critical periods in the lives of democracies. They 
select decision makers, shape policy, distribute power, and provide venues for 
debate and socially approved expressions of conflict about factional 
grievances and issues, national problems and directions and international 
agendas and activities.  
 
This means that the election period, which happens every couple of years, and is a 
fundamental part of any democracy, is a very important one for any government, and 
for political scientists, because it serves as a gauge to determine the health of the 
democracy. The election period creates an opportunity for political parties and their 
leaders to present what they believe to be the best future for a country and with that a 
view on what their beliefs and strategies are. These strategies are presented to 
members of the public who, on a pre-determined day, go out and vote for the party 
they believe will best represent them and serve their needs. It is thus vitally important 
in a modern democracy for any party that has aspirations to win an election to run a 
good election campaign. 
 
It is also important to note that the formation of political parties that run in elections 
has a big impact on society because it institutionalises the existing group alignments. 
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Once voters form party loyalties, and interest groups establish party ties, these links 
become self-perpetuating. Dalton (2014:136) writes:  
 
At each election, parties turned to the same social groups for their core 
support, and most members of these groups habitually support the same 
parties. In one of the most often cited conclusions of comparative politics, 
Lipset and Rokkan stated that “the party system of the 1960s reflect, with but 
few significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s” (1967:50). 
 
This alignment to a political party is called partisanship and is described as a voter’s 
predisposition to support their preferred party. Philip Converse (1966) described 
partisanship as the basis for a normal vote, which is the vote expected from a voter 
when other factors in the election are evenly balanced. If other factors come into play, 
such as issue positions or candidate image, their influence can be measured by the 
change in preference from initial partisan predispositions.  
 
Dalton (2014:194) writes that it is very valuable to understand how a country’s 
voters’ predisposed partisanship is constructed because this knowledge is one of the 
cornerstones to understanding how citizens manage the complexities of politics and 
make reasonable decisions at election time. Dalton lists the reasons why partisanship 
is an important element to understand when looking at elections as follows: 
 
• Creates a basis of political identity 
• Provides cues for evaluating political events, candidates, and issues 
• Mobilises participation in campaigns and election turnout 
• Provides cues on voting preferences 
• Stabilises voting patterns for the individual and the part system 
 
Party identification, as stated by Michigan researchers and Dalton, is similar to 
identifications with a social class, religious denomination, or other social groups. It is 
the long term psychological identification a voter has with their preferred political 
party (Dalton, 2014:186). According to the partisanship model, this means that a voter 
does not consider a political party as a distant, removed institution, but as something 
that they can call “my” party. This party identification is also formed at a very young 
age and plays an important role in a voter’s behaviour and opinions in the long term.  
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Because partisanship is seen as such an important element in determining the outcome 
of an election and how the general voting population will respond during an election 
it came as quite a surprise when researchers found that in many established 
democracies voters were becoming dealigned: thus their party ties were eroding 
(Dalton, 2014:194). According to Dalton, and other researchers such as Wattenberg 
(2002), Fiorina (2002), Clarke and Stewart (1998): 
 
Voters are not simply defecting from their preferred political parties in one or 
two elections, or just in the United States. Instead, across a wide set of nations, 
the evidence shows an erosion in partisan loyalties – the same loyalties that 
electoral research emphasized as a core element in explaining citizen political 
behaviour…Researchers first thought that dealignment was a temporary phase, 
as parties and politicians struggle with new problems that weakened their 
support in the short term (like a sports team on a losing streak). However, 
dealignment has become a continuing feature of contemporary politics.  
 
One of the reasons for this dealignment is the impact media has had on the voters and 
the insights they have on what can be expected from parties and how parties are 
performing. Voters used to find out about a party at a campaign rally or from party 
canvassers, but prospective voters now turn to their televisions, newspapers and other 
media sources to inform them about a party. And as Dalton notes, while there has 
been a strong decline in the circulation figures of newspapers and magazines, there is 
a remarkable increase in the use of the Internet as an information source. Two-thirds 
of Americans say they regularly rely on the Internet, and that the Internet is the source 
of information that is most commonly used by the young (Dalton, 2014:22 and Pew, 
2012a). 
 
This shift in attitude from the electorate where they have moved from being strongly 
aligned to a single party to being dealigned impacts on the party strategy that needs to 
be followed during that party’s election period.  
 
Election campaigns can be described as the roadmap or strategy that a political party 
follows to ensure that it garners as many supporters as possible in order to stand the 
best chance of winning an election. Since most countries have had several elections 
previously, this accumulation of support inherently means that there is another party 
that will lose support. It is therefore important for political parties to also position 
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themselves against their competitor parties so that the public can understand why one 
party should be followed instead of another one. 
 
This campaign roadmap is drafted before the actual campaigning starts. The book 
Political campaign communication outlines the steps a party should take to prepare 
for an election. It states that the best way to understand how a political campaign is 
constructed is by looking at the initial introduction of the candidates by the parties to 
the public. This is called “surfacing” (Trent and Friedenberg, 2004). 
 
“Surfacing” is where a political party sets up its financial backing, introduces the 
party leader and builds a political organisation in each city or region (Trent and 
Friedenberg, 2004). The party will then demonstrate the candidates’ fitness to hold 
office and the calibre of its party members by using the candidates’ past credentials, 
future plans and positioning to show that they are trustworthy, intelligent, 
compassionate, articulate, poised and honourable (Trent and Friedenberg, 2004). 
Finally the candidates will be positioned and represented to the public in different 
ways to display various elements of their personalities and the party’s position on 
tough issues, defining who the opposition is and developing a campaign style so 
voters can become used to the party rhetoric (Trent and Friedenberg, 2004). 
 
An instrumental part of any political campaign is thus the communication or rhetoric 
that takes places between the party and the public. In a modern democracy the media 
plays a crucial role in making the rhetoric of the political party known to the possible 
voters. As Artenton noted:  
 
A symbiosis of the goals of journalists and those who manage campaigns 
provides for a good deal of mutually beneficial interaction. On the one hand, 
news reporting organizations certainly define the presidential race as a story 
which must be covered…and are willing to expend considerable resources in 
news gathering…Presidential candidate organizations, on the other hand, seek 
to use the news reporting process as a relatively inexpensive means of 
communicating with voters and political activists. Campaigns, therefore, are 
happy to facilitate journalists in the conduct of their work (Artenton, 1984:26). 
 
The media plays a very important role in making the public aware of a candidate’s 
position, plans and campaign strategy, but it also gives the audience cues through 
which they get a feeling for what the more nuanced positions are that the political 
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parties and candidates stand for. As the researcher G. Ray Funkhouser (1973) noted, 
“The average person takes the media’s word for what the ‘issues’ are, whether or not 
he personally has any involvement or interest in them”.  
 
Williams and Gulati (2008) analysed the impact of new media on electoral outcome in 
their study through the use of a multivariate regression model and summarise that 
“Online campaign activity is an important additional indicator of candidate viability 
that is independent of traditional measures like expenditures, media coverage and 
organizing activities, represented in our model by campaign events”.  
 
Williams and Gulati (2008) further analysed the importance of having an online 
campaign by determining what the actual impact of online campaign activity is and 
found that if there is a clear and integrated online campaign strategy then the 
candidate using it will see a direct positive impact:  
 
This impact remains even after controlling for campaign and candidate 
specific factors such as the state’s demographic and political character, caucus 
vs. closed primary, or favourite son status. Facebook support had a non-
significant, near zero impact on vote share only for those candidates who 
made little effort to cultivate a social network presence and integrate it into 
their campaign strategy (i.e., Romney and McCain). 
 
It is clear to see that no political party in the United States can go to the polls without 
having a very clear and strong new media strategy in place.  
 
As in political engagement, there are inequalities that can be pointed out regarding the 
levels of participation and involvement (Shirky, 2008) in social movements. Sebastião 
and Elias (2012) noticed in the example of Portugal that the young people adhered to 
what has been termed slacktivism, where they preferred to press the like button on 
Facebook rather than take action – even on the Internet where they preferred not to 
share, subscribe, produce content or engage in offline participation.  
 
The various models that investigate the impact the media has on a political campaign 
will not be discussed in depth here. What is important to note is that scholars from as 
far back as the 1940s have believed that the media generally have weak effects during 
election periods. More recent literature has been more diverse in its findings 
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(Lazarsfeld and Berelson, 1948:73–104), stating that the media may have a 
reinforcement effect on voters who have already decided which party to support; but 
for the undecided, a candidate’s image, including their media image, may only really 
influence voter behaviour in highly mediatised elections (Kuhn, 2013).  
 
This paper is comfortable to support Trent’s findings that mass media has a 
tremendous impact on political campaign communication and reception of the voters 
(Trent and Friedenberg, 2004). He argues that TV is the most important medium that 
a political party can use, but that it must be used in alignment with new media. Trent 
and Friedenberg states regarding new media:  
 
Without a question, the 2008 presidential bid by Barack Obama changed 
forever the use of the Internet and Web 2.0 in campaigns. The Obama 
campaign utilized new media, providing the blueprint for future campaigns. 
Political scientists Jody Baumgartner and Jonathan Morris call Obama 
‘America’s first Internet President’” (Trent and Friedenberg, 2011). 
 
From this section it is clear that there are many elements surrounding the way a 
political party and candidate are introduced to the voter and that the way media, new 
and traditional, is used in a campaign is vitally important. The next section will 
examine exactly how new media was used in three cases: the United States of 
America, India and Brazil.  
 
New Media and Electioneering in the United States 
 
Understanding that having a clear new and old media strategy for a political party is 
very important and is especially true for the United States of America. No other 
nation in the world consumes as much mass communication as they do. By 2010, 
there were at least 1 400 daily newspapers, with a circulation of 48,6 million; about 
11 280 commercial radio stations; and 6 771 TV stations. About 99% of households 
own a television and 57% subscribe to cable television (Trent and Friedenberg, 2004).  
 
There were 204 million active Facebook users and 145 million Twitter users in 
America by 2010 (statsita.com, 2014). Globally, Facebook has over a billion active 
users. It is therefore rather tempting to suggest that the voices of the public are 
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becoming louder and more important as they post and tweet to a global audience, 
bypassing traditional media and promoting their own diverse perspectives, views and 
news. The interactive framework supported by Facebook in particular does, indeed, 
provide the means whereby a debating space in which many voices can talk to each 
other is enabled (Ross and Burger, 2014). 
 
The influence the Internet, and new media through the Internet, had on electioneering 
in the United States cannot be overstated. It has irrevocably changed the way 
candidates in the United States communicate with the public, be it through the use of 
social media channels such as Twitter and Facebook, where they have immediate, 
unfiltered access to talk to and hear from their support base; or on YouTube, where 
any candidate can post their speeches and campaign messages or less formal appeals 
at near-zero cost.  
 
Regarding Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign, Miller (2008) writes: “Mr Obama used 
the Internet to organize his supporters in a way that would have in the past required an 
army of volunteers and paid organizers on the ground.”  
 
He goes on to explain that this was possible because of the way Obama’s team used 
the new media platforms, especially YouTube. Miller (2008) draws the comparison 
between the value and reach Obama got through YouTube by pointing out that the 
videos on Obama’s YouTube page were watched for 14.5 million hours and that the 
same number of hours on broadcast TV would have cost $47 million.  
 
In his paper, Jim Macnamara describes how new media is used in electioneering by 
highlighting the way key figures such as Hillary Clinton used YouTube to announce 
her candidacy for the presidency (Macnamara, 2008:2). The shift has also seen 
traditional media having to adapt to the way it presents content such as presidential 
candidate debates. This turning point in the use of new media in political 
electioneering is seen clearly in the example from Macnamara (2008:2):  
 
Another turning point in the use of new media in political electioneering was a 
broadcast of a September 2007 presidential candidates’ debate jointly by CNN 
and YouTube. Whereas, previously, network television and major newspapers 
dominated coverage of electioneering and were the primary sites of 
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electioneering advertising and publicity, a major shift is evident in mediated 
communication during political campaigns. 
 
Looking at the Obama campaign, the first thing that becomes apparent regarding their 
new media strategy is that there was a clear integration between the offline campaign 
events, the traditional media communication and the messages that were sent out 
online. The team of web specialists that were hired in 2008 by the Obama campaign 
executed this strategy. The Obama campaign spent $25 million on new media and in 
most campaigns today about 5 to 10% of a campaign’s budget is spent on new media 
(Rowley, 2010).  
 
The first elements that the Obama campaign introduced to ensure online success was 
to create the correct platforms, a website, an email list and a digital distribution 
system. Then the campaign added the “bells and whistles” of tweeting, blogging, 
posting on Facebook and putting videos on YouTube.  
 
According to Kluver, what Obama did well in his online strategy was to inform, get 
people involved, connect with them, and mobilise them. They believe that “the 
necessary strategic, rhetorical, structural, and aesthetic choices in Web production are 
made within the context of the campaign as a socio-technical organization” (Kluver, 
2007). This means that the entire online campaign needs to be preconceived, with 
thought going into the way the digital environment should be constructed, both from 
the technical side and from the sociological perspective where the users’ behaviour 
and needs have to be considered.  
 
The campaign organisers also constructed a list of what they believed to be the 
minimum requirements for a campaign website: a biography, issues positions, 
campaign news, links to other sites that support the campaign’s ideas and shares its 
thoughts, links to social media platforms, donation information, contact information 
(in addition to email), volunteer sign-up, photos of campaign events, and a campaign 
calendar (Kluver, 2007).  
 
This list will serve as the basic foundation of what can be expected from a political 
party’s campaign website. In the case of the Obama campaign, however, they did not 
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stop with the website. The Obama campaign team also created a dedicated social 
media site, My.BarackObama.Com, which was affectionately called MyBo, where any 
user could sign up and use the site’s tools to organise for the Obama campaign. Three 
million users signed up. The site simply states “5 things you can do” with easy to use 
tools and how-to videos to support any user. The key functions of the site were 
fundraising, networking and events.  
 
There was also a host of other apps, mobile WAP sites and social media pages created 
so that the voters could easily engage with the Obama team, and for them to be 
empowered to canvass voters for Obama. This was done through the ‘call a 
neighbour’ campaign, where they motivated supporters to go to their neighbours to 
tell them about the Obama campaign. 
 
One of the most powerful angles that the Obama campaign employed was their use of 
email marketing where they offered “A message written just for you”. As Harfoush 
writes: 
Email was the most common way people connected with the Obama 
campaign. Supporters became familiar with seeing messages from various 
staffers in their inboxes and could follow the campaign through a variety of 
perspectives: a strategic bird’s-eye view from Plouffe, frontline reports from 
Carson, and messages of hope and change from Barack himself. Subscribers 
could also get emails from Michelle Obama, Joe Biden, Jill Biden, and even 
Al Gore encouraging them to get involved in the movement. To nurture these 
relationships all campaign emails embodied a three-word mantra: respect, 
empower, and include (Harfoush, 2009). 
 
From the elements that have been identified above it is clear that there were many 
campaign strategies that were combined to ensure that the Obama campaign would be 
dubbed the first Internet campaign in America. They made sure that all the basics 
were in place: from the website to the email marketing strategy, to how they could 
effectively target audiences on existing social networks such as Facebook and 
Twitter; and from there draw them into their own social networks and controlled 
environments to ensure that every willing supporter would be activated and enabled to 
spread their message online, and offline.  
 
When the recent political moves in India are examined similar trends in the political 
campaign strategies used by the Obama campaign above are being used by the main 
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political parties in India This has come hand in hand with a strong growth in the 
number of active social media profiles in the country.  
 
New Media and Electioneering in India 
 
From the section above regarding the Obama campaign it is clear that the strategy a 
political party implements regarding its new media strategy is hugely important 
because it is a key way to increase the party’s audience and support base.  
 
Talking more generally about the role new media has played in India, Friedrich 
Kittler argues that new media was used very well by the leading Hindu party because 
they have been able to “render the past into an accessible presence” (Kittler, 1999).  
 
This means that because of new media, which is unregulated and open to anyone to 
create and post content, the ruling party, by invoking a bygone era, was able to restore 
the past in the way it wanted it to be restored and remembered (Ginsburg, 2002:383).  
 
He further accurately states that even if the secularist parties had believed in the past 
that a technology, with new media, for unifying the nations was at hand, they were 
nevertheless confounded by the material force of a communication medium that 
allowed a regressive politics to be mobilised. But he also accurately states that if the 
Hindu nationalists for their part assume that with the past on their side the future is 
theirs, matters could prove more complicated. The embodied history of a caste-
divided society could also be summoned by new media, which would set a different 
dynamic in motion, slow but sure in its effects, and spotlighting the fabricated 
character of Hindu unity.  
 
In the 2014 election in India the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) swept up 427 seats in 
India’s lower parliament, and India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, was one of 
the most active politicians on social media. Mckenzie (2014) writes:  
 
Modi has been an avid social media user for some time now and perhaps this 
earlier start may have given him a better competitive edge even if some of the 
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other candidates and parties demonstrated a fairly strong online presence 
during the campaign and election period. 
 
Over the past few years, a large majority of the youth in India became eligible to vote, 
with 150 million new eligible voters between the ages of 18 and 23, making 75% of 
the voting population under the age of 35. Internet penetration has grown 
considerably at 14% year on year and is currently estimated to be at 243 million or 
about 19% of India’s population (Internetlivestats.com, 2014). In the last election 
there was also an unprecedented voter turnout with 66.4% of the eligible voters 
casting a vote compared with the 57.5% turnout that was seen in the 2012 US 
elections. (Mallet, 2014 and Mckenzie, 2014). These stats lead Jessica Mckenzie to 
write: “India’s 2014 election is being called a #TwitterElection because it is the 
largest democratic election in the world to date…” 
 
In 2012, when Narendra Modi was the Gujarat chief minister, he made a name for 
himself as the first Indian politician to engage with citizens on social media, 
according to the newspaper, The Times of India (2012). When Modi held a Google 
Hangout2 session on 30 August 2012, where he invited anyone from the public to talk 
to him on Google’s free chat platform and where he answered a variety of questions 
about the state agenda, #ModiHangout became a top trending topic in the country. 
The hangout itself became so popular it took 45 minutes to begin because, as 
Dinakaran reported on The Hindu Business Line in 2012, “By the time the event 
started, it was well over 8:45pm. The reason; the response was so much that Google 
Plus reportedly crashed”.  
 
Modi also promoted the use of social media as the communication platform of choice 
during the build-up to the election and after he won. One clear example of this was 
that he chose to announce that he had won via Twitter, before he made a statement 
anywhere else. A possible reason for this was that he had 4.27 million fans following 
him on Twitter, so the reaction would be immediate and unfiltered. He now has 6.04 
million followers (Twitter, 2014). According to Annalisa Merelli from the website 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A Google Hangout is an online video conferencing session where any member of the public can access the video 
feed that is being sent by the person that initiated the session. This means that every participant can watch the 
interview and send questions while the interview is going on.	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Quartz, 56 million election-related tweets were posted between 1 January 2014 and 
12 May 2014 (Merelli, 2014). 
 
Twitter put this in perspective by writing on its website:  
 
…in the 2009 elections, there was just a single active politician with 6,000 
Twitter followers. This Lok Sabha Election, Twitter became the medium of 
choice for people to engage in and consume political content. Take any metric: 
original content generated, engagement by political leaders, user engagement 
with content, news breaks, influence on political discourse or capacity to set 
media agenda — it happened on Twitter (Khursheed, 2014). 
 
Facebook also saw a significant amount of online election activity. Katie Harbath, the 
Global Politics and Government Outreach Manager at Facebook, wrote in an email to 
techPresident: 
 
From the day elections were announced to the day polling ended, 29 million 
people in India made 227 million interactions (posts, comments, shares, and 
likes) regarding the Indian Elections on Facebook. In addition, 13 million 
people made 75 million interactions regarding Narendra Modi (Chao, 2014). 
 
The growth in Modi’s Twitter and Facebook audiences has not been by accident. He 
has followed a very focused campaign strategy that holds social and new media as a 
key part of this strategy. By 2013 Narendra Modi already had eight million fans on 
Facebook; on 6 March 2014 he had 11 million fans on Facebook and as the national 
campaign picked up momentum he increased his fanbase by 28.7%, passing 
14 million fans by 12 May – the second most liked politician on Facebook, trailing 
only Obama (Das, 2014). 
 
Narendra Modi achieved this by making sure that his offline campaign activities were 
well broadcasted online. This was especially successful when he posted photos of 
himself with celebrities in India. One photo of Modi standing with the well-known 
film star Rajinikanth was liked, shared and commented on by more than 2.2 million 
people.  
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Modi’s campaign also created other support networks on Facebook such as “India 
272+”, a volunteering programme that used the party’s huge support network to 
organise massive mobilisation through events (Das, 2014).  
 
New media and social media are also being used by Narendra Modi as a tool to assist 
Indians who are in need or in trouble. During the Kashmir floods in September 2014 
there was a period when the telephone lines were disconnected and only 3G networks 
were working, and the co-ordination around saving flood victims turned to Twitter. 
As the New York Times wrote (Najar and Barry, 2014): 
 
So many messages were surging into Twitter under the hashtag 
#KashmirFloods that on Tuesday Mr. Khursheed’s colleagues commissioned a 
piece of code that could winnow out those that identified stranded people. He 
then called the Indian Army—which has only two officers permanently 
assigned to monitor social-media postings—to offer the authorities a slimmed-
down, organized feed that he described as “a continuously updating stream of 
‘save me’s.’ ” 
 
Using Twitter as a platform in rescue operations was unheard of only a few years ago 
but this has changed because of one driver of this change, the new prime minister, 
who regards social media as a central link to the public. Mr. Modi’s example has 
filtered through the system (Najar and Barry, 2014). 
 
“If they see a man at the top embracing this form of communication—when you have 
someone who is bypassing traditional media and communicating this way—that is a 
sign,” said Mr. Saran, a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a policy 
research group based in New Delhi. “You don’t have to be told more.” (Najar and 
Barry, 2014).  
 
This impact must, however, be seen in the context of greater India where 70% of 
Indians reside in rural areas, millions of whom live in poverty. Annie Gowen and 
Rama Lakshmi from the Washington Post website quotes Sanjay Kumar, an election 
expert and director of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, on their 
websites: “The importance of social media has grown, but look at the size of the 
population, the number of people living in villages, the number of illiterates” (Gowen, 
2014). 
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It has to be conceded that the reality of whether the online audiences only mirrored 
the real world situation is difficult to answer. As mentioned above, traditional and 
new media content only serves to amplify existing trends and thoughts in society. So 
trying to answer the question of whether a like or a tweet can lead to a vote or 
whether social media is simply a mirror of public sentiment is a tricky question since 
it’s probably a bit of both. 
 
Rebecca Chao does pose a valuable argument when she concludes that even though 
there are many similar trends between what happened online and offline in the 2014 
Indian election, that does not mean that the online audience dictated offline 
behaviour. The one thing that is a certainty regarding future elections in India: “With 
double digit increases in Internet adoption, it is inevitable that social media will 
become a must in future elections in India” (Chao, 2014). 
 
In the case of India, social media and new media have played an enormous role in 
making histories available that were once not easily accessible. It cannot be said that 
this altered the outcome of the election; it has, however, given the political players 
access to tools that dramatically improve the communication they can send to their 
electorate as well as giving them a reach that would have otherwise cost them 
enormous sums of money. The reality as stated by Ginsburg is that new media can 
sway the future of India’s elections heavily as the conversation around the caste 
system develops and possibly changes the narrative in Indian politics dramatically.  
 
What needs to be taken from the case study of India is that when a political party 
identifies a rhetoric that resonates with a society then new media has the power to 
send this message to the masses at an unparalleled speed. In the case of Narendra 
Modi, it is the fine execution of this strategy that needs to be taken from this case 
study.  
 
From what was seen above, it becomes clear that in a developed democracy such as 
the United States the use of online tools and smart segmentation is of vital 
importance; but that in the case of the developing democracies which are not 
positioned to be as smart, political parties need to rely more on the inherent 
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networked nature of social media to spread their rhetoric. What they need to ensure is 
that they have a clear and strong message that their followers can share and that can 
spread easily.  
 
New Media and Electioneering in Brazil 
 
In Brazil the presidential and legislative elections’ first round took place on 5 October 
2014. The president serves a four-year term and the current president, Dilma Rousseff 
of the Worker’s Party, is Brazil’s first woman president. Her main opposition is 
Marina Silva. Silva originally planned to stand as a presidential candidate under the 
banner of a new party called Rede (“Network” in Brazilian Portuguese). She needed 
492 000 signatures from voters in order to gain ratification for her new party, but only 
442 500 signatures were accepted, and as a result she had to throw her support behind 
Eduardo Campos from the Popular Socialist Party. In August 2014, however, Campos 
died in a plane accident and Silva became the party leader.  
 
Campos, who had garnered only 8% of the vote in opinion polls, was not a threat to 
the re-election of President Rousseff (Workers Party or PT), or the efforts of 
opposition candidate Aécio Neves da Cunha (Brazilian Social Democracy Party or 
PSDB), in the run-up to the 5 October election. However, Silva did represent such a 
threat according to three national opinion polls and the election results on 5 October 
where the results were 41.59% for Rousseff, 33.54% for Neves and 21.31% for Silva. 
 
Following the death of Campos, former senator Silva was selected as the PSB’s new 
presidential candidate, with federal representative Beto Albuquerque, from the state 
of Rio Grande do Sul, standing as her vice-presidential candidate. Albuquerque is a 
politician with links to agribusiness, a long-standing member of the PSB and a 
supporter of the Campos proposals (The Economist online, 2014). 
 
Five days after the tragedy, a survey by the respected Datafolha Institute showed that 
Silva and her party had leaped in the polls, capturing 21% of voting intentions, 
compared with 36% for Rousseff and 20% for Neves. Analysts attributed this to the 
fact that emotions were running high, and that this had spurred interest in the story 
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surrounding Silva and her green political campaigns. Poll numbers continued to grow 
in the build-up to the election and Silva was favoured to come second in the election. 
However, as Dom Philips for Time.com (2014) writes: 
 
Neves’ resurgence can partly be explained by the worrying state of the 
country’s economy. The country is technically in recession, having retracted 
0.6% in the second quarter of this year, and 0.2% in the first. The International 
Monetary Fund revised its prediction for Brazil’s 2014 GDP growth down to 
0.3%, from the 1.3% growth it had estimated in June. 
 
This combined with the public’s perception that Neves is a stronger player when it 
comes to economic reform and growth meant that he quickly replaced Silva as the 
runner-up in the election. It is interesting to note that Time.com (2014) mentioned the 
televised debates as the main medium that made the public change its vote from Silva 
to Neves. “…and Neves was able to present himself as a stronger candidate for 
change, with a tough performance in the last two television debates. He rode a last 
minute wave of support to second place”. 
 
One way to explain the growth in support for Silva is through Dalton’s explanation 
regarding the way an electorate perceives and behaves towards ‘Old Parties’, such as 
the Popular Socialist Party, and ‘New Parties’ and ‘New Party Leaders’, such as 
Silva. Dalton (2014) writes that:  
 
As traditional social group influences decrease in importance, the New Politics 
(or postmaterial) cleavage may produce a new partisan alignment. 
Environmental protection, gender equality, multiculturalism, and other social 
issues are not easily related to traditional class or religious alignments. 
Furthermore, New Politics issues attract the attention of the same people who 
are weakly integrated into the old Politics: the young, the new middle class, 
the better educated, and the nonreligious.  
 
This means that a shift in leadership, as seen with Silva, could see a strong portion of 
the youth and dealigned voters choosing to rather support Silva’s New Politics instead 
of supporting the incumbent leader. From what has been discussed thus far it is clear 
that when political parties plan and run their campaigns they need to focus on having 
a strong new media combined with a traditional media strategy as well as concentrate 
on how they will address the party dealignment trend discussed above.  
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New media has seen a strong growth period in Brazil in the past few years. As The 
Economist wrote in its 15 March print edition:  
 
In June [2013] Brazil’s elites received a rude introduction to the power of 
social media. Protests, many convened via Facebook, saw millions take to the 
streets to air disaffection with politicians. Those same politicians now want to 
harness social networks for their election campaigns (The Economist online, 
2014). 
 
The growth of digital has seen the online audience of Facebook in Brazil grow from 
six million monthly users in 2010 to 83 million monthly users by March 2014. This 
growth has moved Brazil into the third spot when it comes to Facebook populations, 
with only India and the United States ahead of them (The Economist online, 2014). 
One in ten Brazilians tweet; one in five use WhatsApp, the instant messaging 
platform. In 2013, more than 105 million Brazilians, which is about 52% of the 
country’s population, accessed the Internet, according to the Brazilian Institute of 
Public Opinion and Statistics, Ibope. A Social @ Ogilvy survey of 16 countries, 
including the United States and Brazil, showed that Brazilians spend an average of 
13.8 hours a month on social networks, more than any other country (Glickhouse, 
2014).  
 
In Brazil the growth in social media platform audiences is good news for the 
opposition parties, since the traditional media, especially television (which reaches 
65% of Brazilians) is dominated by the president who will have access to around 50% 
of all of the available television airtime. 
 
This, coupled with the strong growth of the platform, has seen opposition party 
leaders such as Marina Silva and Aécio Neves focus heavily on growing their social 
media basis. This strategy has shown strong results with Silva sitting on 1.5 million 
Facebook followers and 933 000 Twitter followers on 1 September 2014, and 
2.2 million Facebook followers by October; Aécio Neves on 1.2 million followers but 
only 75 000 Twitter followers by September and 2.2 million Facebook followers by 
October; and Eduardo Campos, who passed away in August, on 1.7 million likes and 
61 000 followers on Twitter in September and 1.9 million Facebook followers by 
October. The president, Dilma Rousseff, had yet to reach the million mark with 
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996 000 followers on Facebook, but had a large following of 2.75 million on Twitter 
by September. By October she was on 1.4 million followers on Facebook. 
(Twitter.com and Facebook.com, 2014). This growth between September and October 
2014 shows that new media is one of the primary platforms the electorate use to find 
out about their and other political leaders and parties.  
 
The younger segment of the market in Brazil is a big target for the party leaders with 
nearly 80% of Brazilians aged 16 (the legal voting age) to 25 using the Internet at 
least once a week, which is well above the national average of 47%. Nearly half go 
online every day. At 18 voting becomes obligatory in Brazil, so the candidates’ task is 
not so much to get the voters out as to ensure the voters tick the right box (The 
Economist online, 2014).  
 
It is clear from the press and looking at the focus that social media has received in 
Brazil that the new media environment has become a critical part of the parties’ 
communication strategy. But they also realise that their communication strategy 
should be cross-platform, using their social base to amplify a TV campaign or a 
debate.  
 
This means that in most modern day elections new media will play a very important 
role in determining how a party’s base support thinks about a candidate as well as 
how an undecided voter thinks, making it extremely important for candidates to 
manage and grow their social media followings and new media platforms. This is a 
constant trend that has emerged in the developed as well as developing countries’ 
political strategies.  
 
Criteria for Success 
 
From this analysis of electioneering and the three case studies that have been 
highlighted above, a set of criteria for success can be constructed to determine what a 
political party has to do during an election period to ensure that it can be deemed as 
using new media successfully. These criteria will frame the research question of this 
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paper: How was new media used in the 2014 South African national election, and 
which, if any, of the political parties used new media well.  
 
What the Obama campaign case study above has brought to light is that the organisers 
implemented a very well thought-out and carefully constructed online strategy where 
they examined the positive elements of each of the platforms they had at their 
disposal. They then created and targeted opportunities online and offline where their 
supporters could find the information they wanted them to see; and empowered them 
to take this information to their family, friends and neighbours in order to canvass 
more voters for Obama. 
 
From the Brazilian and Indian case studies there are two more important elements to 
consider when new media is being used by a political party in an election. The first is 
that new media, as in the case of Brazil, must be used as a highly efficient 
communication tool that enables parties and their leaders to spread a party aligned 
message without having to wait for traditional media to pick it up. Secondly, as in the 
case of India, new media must be used as a community tool that a party and its leaders 
can utilise to drive offline events and activations.  
 
The criteria that can be created from the section above, when the question of how 
political parties used new media in the South African national election in 2014 needs 
to be framed, are as follows:  
 
• Did the parties create an online presence, through the construction of a website 
and social media presence that checks the requirements identified in Kluver 
(2007) above. These are: 
- Biography of the party and the leader 
- Issue positions or manifesto 
- Campaign news  
- Links to other sites that support the campaign’s ideas and share its 
thoughts 
- Links to social media platforms  
- Donation information  
- Contact information (in addition to email) 
- Volunteer sign-up page 
- Photos of campaign events  
- Campaign calendar  
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• Have the parties implemented a targeted marketing campaign that focuses 
their communication on different market segments.  
• Have the parties used new media as a communication tool that enables parties 
and their leaders to spread a party aligned message without having to wait for 
traditional media to pick it up.  





In this chapter it has become clear that the conversation around new media has 
evolved considerably and that the Internet has gone, in a very short period of time, 
from being an unknown space with limited foreseeable opportunities to a force that 
now commands a great deal of attention.  
 
Many writers were sceptical about the impact an unregulated Internet would have on 
society, and were very pro-regulation. This approach was, however, short-lived – 
mostly due to two things. Firstly, private apolitical companies like Google, Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube were formed that made it impossible for the state to impose 
regulations on them. And secondly, the sheer scale of the Internet meant that it would 
not be possible to control who said what online. Which inevitably lead to the open, 
free web, as it is known today.  
 
But this does not mean that the Internet has become apolitical. The role of 
government has never been more discussed than since the cases of mass government 
surveillance worldwide, and especially in the United States by the National 
Surveillance Agency (NSA), have come to light thanks to the American whistle-
blower, Edward Snowden. 
 
A powerful quote from the September 2014 Wired magazine Patriot Act special 
edition regarding Edward Snowden frames the highly political position society is 
taking regarding the role of the government towards the Internet: “If the government 
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will not represent our interests […] then the public will champion its own interests. 
And whistle-blowing provides a traditional means to do so” (Bamford, 2014:89).  
 
It is clear that the struggle for control over the Internet will continue to take place for 
many years and that the government has a central role to play in this debate.  
 
Barrie Axford summarised this well when he wrote in New Media and Politics: 
  
From the core countries in the global economy to the emerging democracies of 
the former ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds, from the top ranks of government and 
business to the grassroots networks of civil society, political communication is 
being transformed by global processes of liberalization and deregulation and 
by the diffusion of new media technologies. Intensifying and unleashing 
forces of media commercialization and conglomeration, these processes are 
giving rise to a series of general tendencies at the top level of national politics 
– altering the way in which social actors and issues are represented in the mass 
media, the ways in which political actors attempt to communicate with one 
another as well as with potential supporters, and, as a result, the very forms of 
those organizations, such as political parties, interest groups and social 
movements, which have long shaped modern political processes (Axford and 
Huggins, 2013:33). 
 
This change in the way the media world is constructed has impacted greatly on 
people’s behaviour when they consider where they should go to find information, 
news and support. This behavioural change, combined with the large degree of youth 
apathy and party dealignment in	   the	   USA, as seen in Dalton’s work, has impacted 
directly on the way political parties plan, execute and measure the success of their 
election campaigns.  
 
In the next chapter the question of how new media and electioneering have developed 
in South Africa will be investigated and from this analysis the set of criteria for 
success that was created above will be reframed to ensure that it is aligned with the 
unique South African environment.  
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Chapter 3 - South Africa: An Overview of Elections and Media  
 
The research problem that was presented in the first chapter was that there are few 
analysts delving into how new media is being used in South Africa by political 
parties, and that the perception is that new media is not playing a big role in the 2014 
election.  
 
From this the research question was developed: How was new media used in the 2014 
national election in South Africa?  
 
The previous chapter broke down what the literature has to say about the development 
of new media and how it is perceived in the political sphere. From here, how new 
media has impacted on elections was investigated and a set of criteria for success was 
developed, by looking at the case studies of the United States, Brazil and India. This 
makes it possible to focus more closely on the question of how new media was used 
in the South African national election in 2014 by looking firstly at the history of 
elections in South Africa, what the ruling parties and opposition parties looked like 
and what has happened in previous elections in South Africa.  
 
After examining the history of elections in South Africa, what was written about new 
media and old media in South Africa will be examined. This will make it possible to 
review the current set of criteria for success, created in the previous chapter, and 
refine it to include or exclude certain parameters.  
 
History of Elections in South Africa 
 
There will be few years in South African history with as much significance as 1994, 
the year the country became a democratic state, held its first elections with universal 
franchise and elected its first black president. Though the world had begun to warm 
up to the idea of a new South Africa in the lead up to the election of 27 April 1994 – 
sanctions had eased and foreign investment had started to trickle in – the doors to the 
world were well and truly flung open in the heady days after the poll. The country’s 
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shift from global pariah to universal icon of hope and reconciliation was as rapid as it 
was largely peaceful (Hadland, 2007). 
 
According to opinion polls conducted during the 1999 election in South Africa, and 
analysed by Kersting (2009:126), party affiliation, which has been highlighted as an 
important indicator to determine election outcomes and voter support in a country, 
declined from 1994 to 1999. 34% of voters then stated that they did not feel close to a 
political party and could be seen as independent voters. This group was comprised 
mostly of Coloured and Indian voters, but the White and African populations in the 
Western Cape Province, which then had the lowest level of party identification, were 
also characterised by these attitudes. The reason for this was that most of these voters 
used to vote for the National Party, and there was no party that had a similar theme in 
the 1999 or 1994 election. Thus a party realignment was still lacking (Kersting, 
2009:126).  
 
In his analysis, Kersting states that there were fifteen million South Africans that 
received social grants, mostly child benefits. The rate of unemployment, according to 
Kersting, was officially 25% and unofficially approximately 40%. The unemployment 
rate, according to Statistics South Africa, has remained pretty much the same, at 
25.5% (Staff, 2014f). According to opinion polls analysed by Kersting, the most 
important election issues in the 1994 and 1999 elections were the fight against 
unemployment, job creation, crime, and poverty. It is clear that different societal 
groups and supporters of the different parties had various perspectives. 88% of the 
ANC’s supporters saw unemployment as the most important issue and poverty (58%) 
as the second most important. The Democratic Alliance’s (DA) supporters saw crime, 
93%, and unemployment, 71%, as the top priority issues and 49% highlighted 
corruption and dishonesty on the part of government officials as relevant issues. Only 
17% of the ANC’s supporters saw this as an issue (Kersting, 2009:126 and Steyn, 
2014).  
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The IPSOS3 reports of 2009 regarding how the South African population felt about 
the political party leaders make it clear that opinion was very divided, especially 
about the incumbents and politicians. Jacob Zuma was the favoured party leader for 
the ANC and had strong support from the Black voters. On the other side was Helen 
Zille, from the DA, who had less support from the Black voters, but very high levels 
of support from White, Coloured and Indian voters (IPSOS, 2009).  
 
What is very important to remember regarding the voting population in South Africa 
is the demographic split between the provinces in South Africa. More than 50% of the 
country’s voting population lives in three provinces: the Eastern Cape, with 13% of 
the voters; KwaZulu-Natal, with 19,3% of the voters; and Gauteng, with 23,6% of the 
voters. Coupled with that the Western Province has the lowest voter turnout (Botha, 
2004 and Kersting, 2009). 
 
The 1999 election also saw great apathy in voter turnout from the youth, with 42% 
not possessing the required identity documentation. One reason given for this poor 
turnout from the youth population was that they were poorly educated regarding the 
electoral process; another reason was the inability of the government to effectively 
implement the rollout of the green identity books that the voters needed to register to 
vote in 1999. The demand for the ID books greatly exceeded the government’s ability 
to produce and deliver them. Johan Olivier wrote in 1998 after doing a survey to 
determine voter willingness combined with the percentage of the population that had 
ID books: “Perhaps the most important finding of the survey was that slightly more 
than nine per cent (9,4%) had no form of ID whatsoever” (Olivier, 1998:24). 
 
Norman du Plessis, the then deputy electoral officer at the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC), ascribed the lack of participation to general youth apathy. On the 
other hand, registration figures for voters aged 40+ reached more than 90%. The 
argument for this huge difference was that most of the voters aged 40+ were involved 
in the struggle against apartheid, whereas the voters aged 20 to 30 were not, and were 
thus not as emotionally motivated to vote (Deegan, 2001). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  IPSOS is a publicly-listed company, managed by research professionals, and the third largest survey-based 
research company in the world. They study audiences and their perceptions of various media and measure public 
opinion trends around the globe. 
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When the way parties campaigned during the 1999 election is examined, it can be 
observed that there was a strong focus on bringing the parties’ manifestos and 
programmes to the electorate. The ANC focused on broadcasting the message of 
continued growth and prosperity which was aimed at informing the poorer 
communities that they were building houses, creating jobs and providing electricity 
and water to the masses as well as improved healthcare with more clinics being built. 
Their main slogan was ‘Our fight for change is showing results’. This message was 
focused on their strong female support base that was unemployed and poorly educated 
(Deegan, 2001). 
 
The Democratic Party (DP), which later became the Democratic Alliance (DA), 
followed an aggressive campaign message in its manifesto and elsewhere, stating that 
the DP had ‘the guts to fight back’ against the government and focused heavily on 
opposing affirmative action. The ‘fight back’ campaign was used against the DP very 
effectively by the ANC when they brought out a range of posters that looked similar 
to those of the DP and stated ‘Don’t fight Blacks’. This campaign thus repositioned 
the DP as a White party that was opposed to helping the Black majority they were 
seeking. This was also seen in the DP’s emphasis on economic growth with a focus 
on the private sector instead of more basic issues. The voter profile for the DP was 
employed, white and educated (Deegan, 2001, SAPA, 1999 and Monare, 2013). 
 
The New National Party (NNP), which was led by Marthinus van Schalkwyk, took a 
less aggressive stance than the DP’s leader, Tony Leon. He visited Sharpeville during 
the campaign period to lay a wreath. The party went out with the message that ‘It is 
only when white South Africans understand the struggle of the black South African to 
be free, that they will really be free’. The NNP was, on paper, a non-racial, non-sexist 
party that favoured the provision of training for women, the young and disadvantaged 
communities. The reality was that they were still very white and had few female 
leaders in the party. Its voter profile was more balanced than that of the ANC or the 
DP, with Coloured and white supporters, and Coloured women forming the largest 
part of its constituency (Deegan, 2001). 
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Finally, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) ran with the slogan ‘Make South Africa 
governable’, which was a central part of its manifesto and focused on job creation, 
crime, poverty alleviation and education. The core constituency of the IFP was made 
up of Zulu speakers in KwaZulu-Natal. Of their constituents, two out of five were 
employed (Deegan, 2001). 
 
From this it becomes clear that the political parties that did well in the previous 
elections were very conservative in their approach and message, meaning that the 
electorate has become observably more dealigned when it came to the 2014 election; 
whereas the EFF, with a strong nationalisation rhetoric, did very well considering the 
trend from the previous elections.  
 
The distribution in the outcome of the 1999 election was as follows (IEC 1999, from 
Deegan, 2001): 
 
• ANC received 10, 6 million votes, 66, 35% of the votes 
• DP received 1, 5 million votes, 9, 56% of the votes 
• IFP received 1,3 million votes, 8,58% of the votes 
• NNP received 1,09 million votes, 6,87% of the votes 
 
A decade later, at the 2009 election, little had changed in the top ranking parties in 
South Africa with South African elections becoming a battle between the ANC, as a 
party regularly winning up to two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly and 
having control of seven or more provinces. The opposition parties that challenged the 
ANC’s party dominance in the 2009 election were the DA, the IFP and COPE who 
had split away from the ANC. However, as Duncan (2014) notes: “… the four 
previous elections had seen a shift towards a de facto one-party system, with the 
smaller parties playing bit-parts in the overall political drama.” 
 
The electorate, however, has changed quite a bit since the 1994 election in South 
Africa, with the population becoming larger (growing from 39,5 million to 
51,8 million in 2011), younger (in 1996, 36% of the population was in the 15-34 age 
category; by 2011 this grew to 44%) and more urban (the population living in ‘urban’ 
areas grew from 52% in 1990 to 62% in 2011) (Duncan, 2014). This means that the 
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voting age population (VAP) has grown from 22,7 million in 1994 to 31,4% in 2014, 
and the representation of women in the registered electorate is at 55%. 
 
In the 2014 election in South Africa a similar landscape with the same party 
dominance that has become the norm in South Africa can be seen. Jacob Zuma, the 
party leader of the ANC, came into power after he became the anti-Mbeki figurehead. 
In 2007 at the party’s national congress in Polokwane, Zuma ousted Mbeki as the 
party leader and thus became the ANC president in September 2008; and then in 2009 
when he was electorally voted in became the country’s president (Kgalema Motlanthe 
became the ‘temporary’ president of South Africa between September 2008 and 
2009).  Zuma’s reign as the president of the ANC and South Africa has been fraught 
with corruption charges. As Southall (Duncan, 2014) writes: 
 
Zuma made it easy for his critics by becoming entangled in a scandal around 
the apparent diversion of public funds to build himself an over-the-top palace 
amid his poverty-stricken followers at Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal. Although 
efforts were made to disassociate Zuma from the scandal by devolving 
responsibility upon unnamed officials, these stretched public credulity, and 
most of the dirt stuck to the presidential name. In any case, by now Zuma had 
already established an unsavoury reputation for advancing the pecuniary 
interests of his family and friends, and advancing favours to powerful backers, 
of whom the Gupta family, from India, gained particular notoriety.  
 
The opposition parties in South Africa by 2014, with ANC dominance over the last 
four successive elections since 1994, have gone through a similar trend of single party 
dominance with a steady rise of the DA as the only real force of opposition. Even 
though 11 other parties secured a total of 68 seats in the 2009 election, none of them 
came close to matching that of the DA, who secured 67 seats on its own (Duncan, 
2014).  
 
The only other parties that were seen as having a potential influence on the outcome 
of the election was the IFP (which had been haemorrhaging votes and was still run by 
the 85 year old Mangosuthu Buthelezi) and possibly the two new parties. These were 
Agang, formed in February 2013 and led by Mamphela Ramphele, the former Black 
Consciousness leader and medical doctor; and the EFF, which was an unexpected 
party to join the race under the leadership of Julius Malema, the former leader of the 
ANC Youth League who took a strong position on radical nationalisation and did 
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considerably well. COPE was seen as a spent force and had been fraught with internal 
problems.  
 
The increase in political competition and stronger opposition parties did not, however, 
translate into a higher turnout at the polls in either the 2009 or 2014 election. The IEC 
registered 25,4 million voters for the May 2014 national and provincial elections. The 
vast majority of the new voters were under the age of 30 years. The youth (voters 
between the ages of 18 and 29) were, however, still a very apathetic base. Of the 10.9 
million eligible voters in this age group, only 58% (6.4 million) of them registered to 
vote. Of the eligible voters between 18 and 19, only 33% registered to vote. The 
breakdown for the rest of the population that registered looks as follows: 80% of 
voters between 30 and 39, 86% of voters between 40 and 49, 93% of voters between 
50 and 59, 90% of voters between 60 and 69, and 94% of voters between 70 and 79 
years (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014:22).  
 
The results of the 2014 South African national election were as follows: 
 
• ANC received 11, 4 million votes, 62, 15% of the votes 
• DA received 4, 09 million votes, 22, 23% of the votes 
• EFF received 1,16 million votes, 6,25% of the votes 
• IFP received 441 854 thousand votes, 2,40% of the votes 
 
From this analysis it is evident that South Africa does have a very active and engaged 
voting population, and that there are signs of voters becoming dealigned from parties 
such as COPE, as seen in the international trends. There is thus a larger onus on the 
political parties to convince their possible voters to become party affiliated or 
partisan. One of the main ways that a party does this is through its use of media, 
traditional and new.  
 
A party uses other channels to send its messages to the voters. It creates its manifesto 
as a base document for the party leader and followers to understand what the salient 
topics are. From this the party runs various campaigns to build awareness and rally 
voters. Besides the news media coverage that a party receives, it also runs direct 
marketing campaigns on television and radio, via SMS, and through much more 
labour intensive channels like mass rallies, personal contacts, posters and flyers.  
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Mattes (2014:175) notes regarding the ANC and its campaigning power that: 
 
The country’s political parties are far from equal in terms of their 
organisational capacity to run these sorts of campaigns. The ANC has 
traditionally held a huge advantage over its competitors in this area. […] its 
ability to use its own branches and the Youth League and to call in the various 
COSATU affiliates to do party work, especially teachers and public servants, 
had been a potent weapon and has allowed the ANC to make face-to-face 
contact with a far larger proportion of eligible voters than any of its 
competitors.  
 
This situation was made worse for the opposition parties in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 
due to the ban on television advertising. This left the opposition parties with the 
option to buy advertising on radio or newspapers, and meant that many of the 
opposition parties did not have the financial means to run a sustained advertising 
campaign and were unable to reach the masses effectively (Mattes, 2013:176). 
 
A final issue regarding the electoral campaigning in South Africa is that the ANC has 
an unfair advantage not only in that it receives much more funding from government 
to run election campaigns, due to its being the incumbent party with a large majority, 
but also in that national and provincial government department funds are used by the 
ANC to trumpet its successes. In the 2014 election, for example, “Johannesburg 
drivers were constantly reminded by roadside adverts sponsored by the Gauteng 
Department of Health of the number of people on state-supported anti-retrovirals” 
(Mattes, 2014:177).  
 
Before new media there were far fewer ways for smaller parties to reach potential 
voters, and the cost of reaching them was much higher.  
 
Old and New Media in South Africa 
 
Jane Duncan identifies an interesting reason why the evidence in South Africa points 
to the media continuing to have a weak effect during elections: the often highly 
critical media coverage of the ANC has not translated into the party bleeding electoral 
support, and the volume of coverage given to its main opposition, the DA, has not led 
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to ANC voters crossing the floor en masse to it. Clearly, the hypodermic syringe 
model of media effects, which has had its critics elsewhere, is especially irrelevant to 
South Africa (Duncan, 2014:134).  
 
By raising the fact that the unfinished business of media transformation has forced 
South African media consumers – especially those from communities still 
marginalised in much media coverage – to become critical, decoding and sifting 
through media messages, and making electoral decisions based largely on non-media 
factors further motivates why the media does not have a strong influence on the 
marginalised communities in South Africa (Duncan, 2014:134). 
 
Duncan also points out that although the media coverage of previous elections in 
South Africa has been overwhelmingly fair, on the whole it has not given voters 
sufficient depth of information to enable them to make informed decisions anyway. 
Media Tenor and MMA found in relation to the 2009 elections that the media’s 
coverage lacked depth and largely failed to cover the issues that were of concern to 
the electorate (Duncan, 2009). 
 
In South Africa the previous elections have seen the press coverage tend to be event-
focused and lacking in analysis. There has also been a high degree of personalisation 
of coverage, with much of it being personality focused. Very little coverage 
concentrated on party policies. Furthermore, few media organisations tracked delivery 
on electoral promises between elections. MMA also called out the media for a lack of 
proactivity in collecting views, leading to the well-resourced parties with efficient 
communications machinery receiving better coverage. An example of this lack of 
analysis can be seen in the 2011 local government election where the main issues 
were around the lack of service delivery, especially sanitation, and the press coverage 
focused mainly on politicians’ statements rather than those of the citizens (Duncan, 
2009).  
 
It is very important to note that by 2014 the South African press was going through a 
very tough period, with advertising and circulation declining year on year. The 2008 
global recession precipitated this period of cost-cutting measures in many newsrooms, 
and media managers retrenched many journalists and restructured newsrooms. 
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Furthermore, newspaper circulation declined, which placed the press under even more 
pressure. However, the investigative journalism teams at the various media 
organisations continued to turn out important work (Duncan, 2009).  
 
In the wake of ANC criticisms of the lack of transformation in the press and the 
inadequacy of the press regulatory system, a series of reforms was introduced to the 
Press Council of South Africa. Time will tell whether these will be sufficient to stave 
off an ANC proposal to reintroduce statutory regulations in the form of a statutory 
Media Appeals Tribunal. In response to the transformation criticisms, the industry 
representative body, Print and Digital Media South Africa, set up a Print and Digital 
Media Transformation Task Team (PMDTT) to investigate the extent of 
transformation in the press. The PMDTT found that the press had significant areas of 
weakness when it came to meeting its Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
targets, and that it should set annual targets to ensure that it met acceptable 
benchmarks.  
 
There can be no doubt that the ANC seized on the lack of transformation for 
opportunistic reasons, using it as a means of placing pressure on an extremely feisty 
and troublesome press. However, there can also be no doubt that the ANC picked on 
significant areas of weakness in the press’s operations, which led to industry-led 
reforms becoming necessary before these areas were used to compromise press 
freedom.  
 
From the graph below (Otto, 1998) it is clear that South Africa has followed the trend 
that is seen in the rest of Africa, with radio being the biggest mass medium in the 
country, followed by TV and then print media. The growth of the Internet has been 
very strong in South Africa. 
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According to an article on the website This is Africa (Barr, 2014), Facebook has 
grown from 25 million users in Africa in 2011 to 52 million by 2014, a number that 
will continue to grow, especially when you take into account that Africa has a very 
young median age. This means that the opportunity for mass democratisation of 
information, as it is known in developed countries, is becoming a reality in the 
developing world.  
 
As seen in the cases of Brazil and India, the most important change that South Africa 
has seen in the past five years – from 2009 to 2014 – is the massive growth in Internet 
connectivity that has taken place. In 2009 there were only 3.9 million citizens 
connected to the Internet and the first iPhone came to South Africa in September of 
2008 – compared with the 21 million people connected to the Internet today 
(Internetlivestats.com, 2014). 
 
According to the November 2013 McKinsey Mobile Report, South Africa has a 
mobile penetration rate of 135%, with many consumers owning more than one mobile 
device. The mobile penetration rate is the number of people in a country that own a 
mobile device. Many South Africans have two mobile devices, one for work and one 
for personal use.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Smith and Jager, 2013) and Deloitte’s smartphone report of 
2013 (Casey, 2013) state that there are currently over 10 million Internet-active 
smartphones in the market and forecasts that there will be 32.3 million mobile 
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Internet subscribers in South Africa by 2017. According to the PwC South African 
Entertainment and Media Report (Smith and Jager, 2013), Internet access via mobile 
devices comprised 89% of the Internet access market (mobile Internet subscribers 
plus fixed broadband households) and 81% of its revenues in 2012.  
 
This large mobile contribution is in line with the trend across the continent and is the 
result of a continued period of investment in cellular coverage and more affordable 
tariffs being offered by mobile networks.  
 
Social media has also seen strong growth with 9.6 million Facebook users, 7.4 million 
Mxit users, 5.5 million Twitter users and 4.7 million YouTube users in South Africa 
in 2013 according to the Bluemagnet report (Meier, 2013). 
 
From the analysis above it is clear that the landscape in South Africa has changed 
dramatically in five years, with Internet penetration doubling and mobile connectivity 
growing exponentially in a very short period of time.  
 
It is important to remember that the impact of Internet penetration is not only on the 
direct line between a party and its followers, but also between the party and the 
peripheral watching audiences, i.e. traditional media and the audiences on social 
media channels. This means that a party’s message and actions can reach masses in a 
much faster and clearer manner. The growth of social media platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook underpins this new wave of open communication and has a very real 
impact on the public’s perception of parties.  
 
According to the DMMA (Digital Media and Marketing) and Effective Measure 
(Effective Measure, 2013), which are the two bodies that audit website traffic in 
South Africa, the average person who is online is aged over 40 (56%), is university 
educated (72%) and has children (64%). This is in line with parties such as the DA 
who have an educated and more urban voter base.  
 
According to Effective Measure’s digital market data for the month of June 2013 
(Effective Measure, 2013), South Africa’s digital community is largely using ADSL 
for its connection (48.73%), followed by mobile connectivity (36%).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   63	  
 
The leading digital audiences are located in Gauteng province, which has the highest 
traffic flow (+46%), spurred by Johannesburg and Pretoria populations. This is 
followed by the Western Cape (21.97%).  
 
Reflecting change in post-apartheid South Africa, recent research by the University of 
Cape Town Unilever Institute of Strategic Marketing shows the black middle class 
has more than doubled in eight years to 4.2 million in 2012, and its annual spending 
has overtaken its white counterpart group (Fletcher, 2013). “The growth in this 
country, both economically and certainly in terms of spending power, comes from the 
black middle class,” Unilever Institute Director John Simpson told Reuters (Fletcher, 
2013). 
 
John Simpson went on to say that the ANC government, which had long focused on 
the poor masses as its core-voting base, is now being forced to pay more attention to 
the black middle class, which it has also helped create through affirmative action 
policies. “They are your enlightened voters; they will support policies, and not just an 
affiliation emotionally,” he told Reuters. “They are drivers of democracy” (Fletcher, 
2013). 
 
However, the online audience in South Africa, when Internet users by monthly 
household income are considered, shows that it is primarily households with an 
income of more than R6 000 per month that use the Internet. According to 
mybroadband.co.za (2014), the breakdown looks as follows: 
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When the population is broken down by race, there is a skew towards White users, 
with 49,81%. Black users make up 33.21%, Coloured, 7,16% and Indian, 4,84%. 
This, coupled with the higher age, income and education of the average Internet user 
in South Africa, makes it clear the Internet was first adopted by the wealthier, 
previously advantaged members of society.  
 
When Internet penetration and online audience growth trends are taken into account, 
however, the conclusion that can be drawn is that even though the higher income, 
white and previously advantaged earners were first to access the Internet, that picture 
is changing and becoming increasingly black and younger as the rest of the population 
gains access.  
 
This means that political players will have to be digitally savvy to ensure that they 
talk to the existing traditional as well as the emerging markets in South Africa. The 
political parties will also have to focus on driving a double communication strategy: 
one strand aimed at talking to the youth, motivating them to become politically 
engaged; and another strand that focuses on the larger, older voter who has remained 
active and engaged in politics, but possibly has a high degree of party dealignment.  
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It is also clear that individuals who have large followings on social media platforms 
also play a big role in steering conversations online. This means that the political 
parties in South Africa will have to focus much more on garnering celebrity 
endorsements or public alignments to ensure their agendas reach larger audiences and 
receive the most traction.  
 
The final criterion for success that will be added to the existing list of criteria created 
in the literature review is that political parties and party leaders in South Africa will 
have to focus on driving a dual communication strategy that on the one hand 
addresses the new, uninformed and young voter, helping them to understand how 
politics works through the use of new media and then enticing them to become 
engaged on these platforms; and on the other hand there has to be a strong drive 
towards educating the existing older users about the party’s fundamentals and agendas 
to ensure that they stay loyal to the party.  
 
The next section will look at how the South African political parties performed when 
measured against the set of criteria for success that was created above. This will make 
it possible to determine whether they implemented a new media strategy, executed it 
well and targeted a clear audience or demographic. This will be done to determine 
whether or not the political parties who took part in the 2014 national election in 
South Africa used new media well.	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Chapter 4 – Findings 
 
The research problem that was presented in the first chapter was that there are few 
analysts delving into how new media is being used in South Africa by political 
parties, and that the perception is that new media is not playing a big role in elections.  
 
From this the research question was developed: How was new media used in the 2014 
national election in South Africa?  
 
In the previous chapters a trend towards dealignment in institutionalised democratic 
parties was identified, and specifically apathy in voter turnout from the youth of each 
country was analysed. To a degree, the same was seen in the case of South Africa, 
where there is a trend of dealignment for some parties as well as there being a large 
segment of the youth that has chosen to abstain from engaging in elections.  
 
This chapter will look at how the South African political parties used Twitter, 
specifically, and the Internet in general, during the 2014 campaign period. The set of 
criteria for success that was developed in the literature review and refined in the 
overview of South Africa will be used to determine whether or not the strategy that 
was followed by the political parties below was successful. This will make it possible 
for us to determine whether or not new media was used well in the 2014 national 
election in South Africa. 
 
The criteria for success looks at how well the parties selected used new media, by 
asking the following questions:  
 
Do their websites check the requirements that were identified in Kluver (2007) above. 
These are: 
- Biography of the party and the leader 
- Issues positions or manifesto 
- Campaign news  
- Links to other sites that support the campaign’s ideas and share its 
thoughts 
- Links to social media platforms  
- Donation information  
- Contact information (in addition to email) 
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- Volunteer sign-up page 
- Photos of campaign events  
- Campaign calendar  
 
• Has the party implemented a targeted marketing campaign that focuses its 
communication on different market segments.  
• Has the party used new media as a communication tool that enables parties 
and their leaders to spread a party aligned message without having to wait for 
traditional media to pick it up.  
• Has the party used new media as community tool to drive offline events and 
activations.  
• Has the party focused on communicating to one or both of the audiences in 
South Africa: the older, mature audience and the new, young audience. 
 
To make it easy to digest the criteria for success, each criterion has been given a 
weighting which counts towards a final score out of 100. The breakdown for the first 
50 points is as follows: 
 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
 
The other 50 points will be given based on the overall communication style and the 
perception of the party’s campaign and strategy. This will be motivated in each one of 
the parties analysed and awarded subjectively. The motivation for this can be 
explained by highlighting the fact that a party could check all of the requirements 
above, by sending out a barrage of messages and communication, but that does not 
mean it was well conceived or executed.  
 
This addresses the issue of quality of content. To rephrase, the parties analysed below 
might have put all the necessary elements in place to ensure that they are seen as 
having a well conceived online presence, but if the communication itself – the tweets 
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and posts that they actually send out – is not well written with a specific target 
audience in mind, they fail to accomplish one of their most important tasks: the 
creation of quality content.  
 
The quality of the content created by the party will be weighed by the traction it 
receives: in other words, by how many times the content is retweeted or favourited. 
This is, however, not the only measure, as quality, when the items listed by Dalton 
above are taken into account, is also measured by the fact that the content needs to 
develop the perceptions potential voters might have about a party. For example, when 
a party makes a tweet or sends out communication, the reader needs to ask questions 
like: Did this tweet improve my perception about the party as a whole or the party 
leaders? Did it inform me about the party’s manifesto or its strategy to improve 
current issues in the system? These questions can only be answered subjectively and 
need to be weighed in the context of the party’s online strategy.  
 
Awarding subjective points allows room to ensure that this study recognises the 
element of content quality and will further ensure that content quality is assigned 
value beyond the empirical points awarded.  
 
This analysis will begin by explaining how the data was gathered. Then each party 
and its leader’s online presence will be analysed and awarded a score as discussed 
above. Finally this will make it possible to determine whether these parties used new 
media well in the 2014 South African national election.  
 
How Data was Captured  	  
Data collection has become an increasingly powerful and easy way to track how 
aware the public is of certain topics. If one takes Google Trends, http://www.google.co.za/trends, as an example, it is very easy to compare how 
much content and news was generated regarding a certain political party. Here the 
ANC, DA, COPE, Agang and EFF’s amount of interest that was generated can be 
compared over a 12-month period and represented in an easy to understand graph: 
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From this it is clear that the national election in South Africa in 2014 created a large 
spike in interest for all parties on 7 May 2014, but that the DA tracked much higher 
than its counterparts, the ANC, EFF, Agang and COPE, with COPE and Agang 
tracking far below the others during the rest of the time. It is also valuable to see that 
at the end of January the interest in Agang spiked when they announced that Agang 
and the DA would form a coalition for the coming election.  
 
Such data analysis, as seen above, can also be done through many other platforms, 
such as the large social media platform Twitter, where a large amount of data 
regarding specific terms and people can be gathered with relative ease and a high 
amount of accuracy.  
 
This study relies heavily on the data that was collected from Twitter. The data 
collection process used worked as follows: All the tweets from the Twitter.com 
website that were sent by the following political parties and key role players – the 
DA, COPE, Agang, the ANC, EFF, Helen Zille, Julius Malema, Kenny Kunene, 
Lekota, the Patriotic Alliance, Jacob Zuma and Mamphele Ramphele – as well as all 
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of the tweets that mentioned these parties or people, were captured and sorted in a 
database.  
 
This means that when an individual on Twitter, such as @danielmal (the Twitter 
handle for Daniel Malherbe) tweets and mentions a political party or one of the 
persons mentioned above, either directly by using that person or party’s Twitter 
handle, such as, @DA_News, then the tweet was categorised and saved.  
 
For example, on the day of the South African national election on 7 May 2014 the 
following tweet was sent by Helen Zille, the party leader of the Democratic Alliance: 
“Why is it that the IEC ALWAYS seems to have logistical problems in DA 
strongholds. Hang in there, please. Your vote essential to SA future.” (Twitter.com, 




Each tweet that was sent out was assigned the following characteristics: 
 
- The date it was sent 
- A timestamp for when it was sent 
- A title for the tweet 
- The URL (direct link to the actual tweet on Twitter.com or a link to where the tweet 
was picked up) 
- The website it was taken from (Twitter.com, ewn.co.za, mg.co.za) 
- The sentiment that was used in the tweet; was it a positive or negative tweet  
- The source type, either Twitter, a blog, a forum, a news website 
- A continent name, such as Africa 
- A country name, such as South Africa 
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- A state code and name, which can be picked up from Twitter bios, such as Western 
Cape 
- The number of followers on Twitter the author of the tweet has 
- The number of Twitter handles (i.e. other people on Twitter) the author is following 
- The number of tweets that the author has sent 
- The number of retweets the author received for the tweet 
- The gender of the Tweeter, male or female; this is also from the Twitter profile and 
only a portion of the Twitter profiles carries this information 
- The type of account; if it is an individual or an organisation 
- The profession the person that has tweeted has placed on their bio 
- The interests the person has placed on their bio 
 
The raw data is represented in an excel document, and it was thus possible to create 




From this data it was then possible to extrapolate information about all the tweets that 
were sent where the keywords, DA_News, DA, Democratic Alliance and Helen Zille 
were used. Trends then became visible: such as there was a much larger male 
segment, 63%, engaging with the DA on Twitter; that the top four interests of those 
who tweeted were from most to least Sports, Family and Parenting, Music and 
Business; and that the gender split over time stayed consistently more male than 
female. Twitter defines gender based on its own gender prediction engine, and not all 
profiles have defined genders.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za




It was also possible to compare the amount of content that was generated for each of 
the parties as well as who created the most content. For example, between the period 
2014 and 12 May 2014, the EFF was mentioned nearly 1 500 times on Twitter. This is 
much higher than that of COPE who only received about 125 mentions. It was also 
possible to then see which users, or unique people, created the most amount of 
content on Twitter. 
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The data gathered also made it possible to look at the amount of content that was 
posted about each of the political parties to see what media, forums, blogs, tweets, 
were the most successful for them in terms of content created about them.  
 
When the example of the Democratic Alliance is taken, it is clear that Twitter was a 
very strong platform for them, a trend that is visible for all parties. Out of the nine 
platforms monitored from 1 February to 12 May, Twitter generated the most mentions 
by a large margin. Second to that was news, which is the mainstream news channels 
and news reporters. After that came the forums and then the other platforms.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   74	  
This breakdown of how data was collected for this study makes it possible to move to 
the analysis part of this study where each one of the parties and their leaders will be 
weighed against the criteria for success developed above.  
 
ANC and Jacob Zuma  
 
The African National Congress has a website that is visible to the public and can be 
accessed by going to www.anc.org.za. The website is not mobile friendly; this means 
that the website does not respond to the smaller size of a mobile device and is very 
difficult to navigate on a mobile device, which is the largest part of the online 
audience in South Africa. 
 
The website focuses mainly on the latest press statements and the latest speeches, 
which are available as text articles. After these there are three articles that are written 
by ANC members, giving their point of view on the various issues such as land 
reform. None of the articles can be shared on social media or even via email. The 
Twitter, YouTube and Flickr pages are pulled through, but Facebook is not. Overall 
the website is in need of a complete overhaul.  
 
Jacob Zuma is the President of the ANC and of South Africa. He has been embroiled 
in many scandals over the past few years, with the most recent being the construction 
of a large personal mansion in Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal with a total cost of 
R246 million being taken from state coffers for the construction (news24.com, 2014). 
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The ANC manifesto is easily found on the website, and the document is readable in 
.pdf format. The main focus points in the ANC manifesto are: 
• The economy and jobs  
• Rural development, land reform and food security 
• Human settlements and basic services 
• Education and training 
• Health 
• Fighting corruption and crime  
 
The ANC Facebook page has 250 000 likes, as of 3 September 2014 and 151 000 
followers on Twitter.  
 
Jacob Zuma tweets under the handle, @SAPresident, and has 335 000 followers on 
13 September. He does not have a Facebook page, but Facebook does mention that 
the topic Jacob Zuma is liked by 60 000 people.  
 
From 1 February 2014 to 12 May 2014, 96 000 mentions of Jacob Zuma were tracked 
online, 6 228 of those mentions were negative and only 2 777 were positive. The 
majority of the audience talking about Zuma online were male (65%). The top Twitter 
accounts that mentioned Zuma were @myanc_, da_news and @helenzille. 
 
The official Twitter account for the ANC, @MyANC_, made 1 252 posts from 
1 February to 12 May 2014. Of their top 20 posts sent out during this time, there were 
only two tweets that dealt with the issues raised in the party’s manifesto. They were: 
 
“”The ANC government provides the child support grants to support 11 
million children from poor households” #Zuma #Siyanqoba” 
 
““The ANC government has invested trillions of rands in the national 
infrastructure programmes” Zuma #Siyanqoba” 
 
During the election period there were 192 000 mentions of ANC from 1 February to 
12 May 2014. 172 293 of the comments were mainly from Twitter; articles iol.co.za 
posted about the ANC were shared about 2 047 times. The majority of the overall 
audience who mentioned ANC were male (65%). 
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In February there were 13 000 mentions of ANC online; the top sites that were used 
to talk about ANC were Twitter, iol.co.za, mybroadband.co.za and news24.co.za. The 
biggest peak in conversations was on 12 February with 2 085 mentions of ANC 
posted on that day. 
 
On 12 March the Democratic Alliance had arranged a march to Chief Albert Luthuli 
House. However the march did not go as planned by the DA as the supporters were 
forced to turn back by ANC supporters before they could reach the ruling party’s 
headquarters at Luthuli House; this created a buzz online as people shared the news 
and their opinions about what happened on the day. The following comments were 
taken from Twitter: 
 
“#ANC supporters chase DA marchers during #DAMarch for #RealJobs in the 
centre of Johannesburg. Photo:#SimphiweMbokazi” 
 
“@vasilisgirasis Personally, I feel the ANC is overreacting by bringing the 
Avengers to JHB in order to protect them against the DA.” 
 
In March conversations about the ANC doubled from February to 32 000. 67% of the 
audience that spoke about the ANC in March were male and there were 2 313 unique 
male authors. The top hashtags used in conversations were #anc (2 999) and #nkandla 
(1 067); the nkandla news dominated online. The top retweeted tweet (473) in March 
was by @justicemalala who has over 80 000 followers. The tweet was: 
 
“@justicemalala what a week for irony. The EFF leader, who faces fraud and 
corruption charges, laid fraud and corruption charges against the ANC leader.” 
 
In April there were 70 000 mentions of the ANC and 5 057 of the mentions were 
negative. There was a spike in conversations on 10 April due to the following top 
news stories: #Nkandla, #Witsdebate and #DMGathering. There were 224 mentions 
of Nkandla on 10 April, 132 mentions of the #WitsDebate and 681 mentions of the 
#DMGathering. Some of the top tweets from 10 April were: 
 
“Gwede just went #Sompisi on @maggsonmedia @eNCAnews #ngikuphila 
#WitsDebate I love Elections and I'm gna vote ANC not EFF (E FELLA FA)” 
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“I also asked Vavi if having Lonmin guy Ramaphosa at a COSATU CEC 
meeting isn't like inviting Helen Zille to an ANC NEC meeting. 
#DMGathering” 
 
In May there were 77 000 mentions of the ANC, 3 132 of the mentions were positive 
and the majority of the audience that posted about the ANC were male (65%). The 
biggest spike in conversations was on 7 and 8 May. The top retweeted tweet (553) 
was a tweet by IECSouthAfrica. IEC has over 50 000 followers: 
 
“National Assembly seats: APC–1; PAC–1; AGANG SA–2; ACDP–3; AIC–
3; COPE –3; UDM–4; VF Plus–4; NFP–6; IFP–10; EFF–25; DA–89; ANC–
249.” 
 
With the ANC Twitter account being the most mentioned, the @encanews account 
was the second most mentioned (1 704). Iol.co.za was the top site to mention the 
ANC, mentioning the party 380 times. Some of the mentions: 
 
“@helenzille By saying that "only clever people" have problems with R246-
mill Nkandla upgrade, Pres Zuma is implying that ANC voters are stupid.  
Eish.” 
 
“Check http://newsWall.Co.Za	   -> #ANC responds2 billing day #SouthAfrica http://bit.ly/1goDruU	  “ 
 
“Call me a sellout for supporting ANC if you want – Vavi” 
 
After the elections there were 33 000 mentions of the ANC from 8 May to 14 May 
and most of the audience driving conversations were male, 65% (2 369). The majority 
of the mentions were neutral and the numbers of negative and positive mentions were 
almost the same. The top negative comment was: 
  
“@Tebohoeff @_cosatu must just forget,ANC thieves to implement 
NDP,endorsed by Coleman of Goldman Sachs,the company that contributed a 
lot to the plan” 
 
The top positive comment was:  
 
“@GarethCliff Congratulations to the ANC for your victory in the election 
this year. Let's make the next five years the best yet. @mgigaba” 
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The conversations on Twitter were driven by the hashtag #elections2014 and 3 839 
Twitter mentions of the ANC included the hashtag. The top three most mentioned 
Twitter accounts were @myanc_, @encanews and @iecsouthafrica. The top 
retweeted tweet with 553 retweets was a tweet by the IEC Twitter account with over 
50 000 followers: 
 
“National Assembly seats: APC–1; PAC–1; AGANG SA–2; ACDP–3; AIC–
3; COPE –3; UDM–4; VF Plus–4; NFP–6; IFP–10; EFF–25; DA–89; ANC–
249.” 
 
The second most retweeted tweet (441) was a tweet by @sentletse, who has over 
47 000 followers and he tweeted an image showing ballot papers that were found:  
 
“The ANC and the IEC must be ashamed of themselves! pic.twitter.com/STwypvLg8M” 
 
The main topics of conversations post elections were messages of congratulations to 
the ANC with posts and articles about results. 
 
Comparing this with the criteria for success that were developed, the ANC scores as 
follows:  
 
The website analysis based on Kluver does quite well. The biography of the party and 
its leaders are available, but not easy to find. The manifesto and campaign news are 
visible on the homepage; there are links to other sites that support the campaign’s 
ideas and share its thoughts as well as links to social media platforms (Twitter, 
YouTube and Flickr). There is an option to donate via EFT or credit card and multiple 
ways to contact the party. There is a volunteer sign-up page, but the documents that 
are needed have to be sent via post or fax. There is very little available in terms of 
campaign events or photos and no easily accessible campaign calendar.  
 
There was no targeted marketing campaign that could be subscribed to or found on 
the website. The Twitter campaign that was used made it possible for users to easily 
receive communication from the ANC, and the ANC was active on this platform, as 
seen above. However, most of the posts that were sent did not have a clear marketing 
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strategy that discussed various aspects of their campaign or highlighted party leaders 
specifically.  
 
The ANC could have used the Twitter platform to communicate actively with their 
electorate. The ANC_News handle has sent only 14 000 tweets compared to the 
DA_news and HelenZille that both have more than 34 000 tweets sent out. The 
majority of the tweets that were sent also started with the very impersonal, “The 
ANC…”, communicating mostly party information and not engaging with the users 
on issues or statements they sent to the ANC.  
 
The same was visible with the use of Twitter when it came to the communication that 
was sent to drive offline events and engagement. There were many retweets that 
happened during big event days, and on occasion when high profile party leaders held 
events there would be a tweet about the event, and they would retweet a few positive 
tweets, but there was little in the way of campaign schedules for followers to be able 
to know the details of what was happening if they wanted to get involved.  
 
The ANC also focused heavily on communicating with the Black, middle and lower 
income groups and they did not engage with the White middle income, Coloured or 
affluent Black market. This can be seen in the lack of answers that were sent by these 
groups and the strong focus on rural and less developed areas.  
 
The criteria for success created above listed the following requirements: 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
 
Even though the ANC had many of the required elements on their website, there were 
elements missing and they did not have a targeted marketing campaign. There were 
many messages sent on Twitter, but there did not seem to be a clear strategy to build a 
community or drive offline events and activations – and there was clearly not a desire 
to include the other groups or audiences in South Africa. A score of 30 out of 50 will 
thus be awarded.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   80	  
 
The other 50 points, which are based on a subjective view of their new media 
strategy, are awarded as follows: 
 
Firstly, there was no overarching strategy visible when the ANC’s new media strategy 
is analysed. Platforms such as Facebook and YouTube were poorly used, with few 
posts and inconsistent content strategies taking place. In the case of YouTube, for 
example, there were posts that announced that there would be a new ANC News 
video discussing the political campaign every Monday, but that was the only video 
that was ever loaded regarding the announced Monday news programme.  
 
Secondly, their manner of communication with the electorate was poor in the sense 
that the ANC did not engage with the electorate regarding any of the statements they 
made. There was never an opportunity for ANC supporters to ask questions, as was 
seen in the Obama campaign where there were many channels and opportunities for 
pro and anti Obama voters to directly engage with him and the party. The 
@ANCwcape Twitter profile did not engage with the people in the Western Cape to 
address issues that were province specific.  
 
This is important when it is taken in the context of Dalton’s (2014) insight that social 
group attachments – which are the attachments that a voter might have to a religious 
group and/or social class – greatly impact on the voter’s electoral decisions. The way 
a political party communicates its political message has to be adapted for the different 
sub-cultures there are in a society. The message that the ANC sends out to the middle-
income Coloured community in the Western Cape has to be much more targeted, 
focusing on highlighting the top issues that affect that social grouping.  
 
Finally, the ANC did not make enough of an attempt to address the youth apathy that 
was seen in the previous chapters, nor did they succeed in garnering the possible 
dealigned COPE voters discussed above. The manner in which they communicated 
was very one-sided: the ANC did not engage with people who posted comments or 
questions online, and they did not ask their following to engage with them. This 
greatly decreased the amount of traction they received online, as well as creating the 
impression that they were not willing to listen to or engage with their audience. The 
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ANC might have posted a large amount of content online, but there did not seem to be 
a coherent strategy driving the content that was posted.  
 
Due to these subjective reasons, and the analysis done in the criteria for success, the 
ANC only scores a 60 out of 100 for the way in which they used new media during 
the 2014 South African national election.  
 
DA and Helen Zille 
 
The main opposition party in South Africa is the Democratic Alliance, DA, and it has 
a very active online strategy.  
 
The DA’s website was rebuilt in mid-2014, and is very modern. It is built on a 
WordPress base and this makes the website mobile friendly, meaning that the content 
that is visible from a desktop is as easily accessed from a mobile device.  
 
Helen Zille is the leader of the DA and the Premier of the Western Cape. She is very 
active on Twitter with 483 000 followers on 13 September 2014. Helen Zille also has 
a Facebook page, with 291 000 followers on her personal page.  
 
There were 16 000 mentions of Helen Zille online from 1 February to 12 May. The 
spikes in conversations about Zille were the same as those of the DA as the majority 
of the party mentions also mentioned Zille. The audience that mentioned Zille the 
most were male, 63%. The top most mentioned Twitter accounts were @helenzille, 
@da_news and @carienduplessis and the top retweeted tweet was a tweet by 
@vuyo_mvoko, who has over 10 000 followers. It received 361 retweets: 
  
“#zille on Ramphele: I offered her the world, she wanted the universe, she's 
ended up with a shack in poffader #sabcnews #morninglive” 
 
The DA’s manifesto is easily found on their website and downloadable in a .pdf 
format. It covers the following key areas: 
• The DA’s values 
• The government 
• Job creation 
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• Small business and business growth 
• Land reform and housing  
• Education and training 
• Wellness, which is sports and recreation, drug abuse and family health  
• The environment  
• Crime 
 
The DA had 138 000 followers on its Facebook platform and 94 000 followers on its 
Twitter page, @Da_News, on 13 September 2014. Of the top 20 posts out of the 
1 700 that were made by the @Da_News Twitter profile, 7 of them were about 
service delivery and the manifesto and 7 were about an SMS that the DA sent out 
regarding Nkandla which the ANC took the DA to court about.  
 
There were 121 000 mentions of the DA from 1 February to 12 May. Of these 6 665 
were negative mentions and 4 503 positive. And the biggest spikes in conversations 
about the DA were in April and May. 
 
In March there were 16 000 mentions of the DA posted online. 283 of the mentions 
were from mybroadband.co.za with Twitter being the top most used platform. The top 
spikes were on 26 and 29 March. News that drove conversation on 26 March: 
 
“Zuma owes Sars R16m - DA http://iol.io/b7488	  “ 
 
“INFOGRAPHIC: You pay tax. So should President Zuma #NkandlaTax --> pic.twitter.com/QFEW9tMoj2” 
 
“Mazibuko Wants No Time Wasted On Nkandla Report: Democratic Alliance 
Parliamentary Leader Lindiwe Mazibuko on ... http://bit.ly/1ry60O5	  “ 
 
There were 1 146 mentions of the DA on 29 March with New24.com mentioning the 
DA 8 times on the day and mybroadband.co.za mentioning the DA 6 times. The DA 
parliamentary leader, Mmusi Maimane,	   @maimaneam, was the second most 
mentioned Twitter account on the day. The top trending topics of that day were: 
 




“@helenzille Take this message to heart and vote DA for the first time! RT 
@JoeyVenter123: FOR SURE pic.twitter.com/os3YNmDVww” 
April 
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In April there were 45 000 mentions of the DA; 1 811 of the mentions were positive 
and 2 558 were negative. Men drove the majority of the conversations, 67%, and the 
biggest spikes in conversation were on 4 and 30 April. 
 
On 4 April there were 2 292 mentions of the DA; bdlive.co.za posted 14 times that 
day about the DA. The top retweeted tweet on the day with 204 retweets was: 
 
“@helenzille So far, the only ppl who have appeared in court over #Nkandla 
are the DA, but we won our case: fair comment to say Zuma stole your 
money.” 
 
There were 2 854 mentions of the DA on 30 April; this was the second biggest spike 
in conversations for the month of April. The conversations on the day were driven by 
a TV advert called Ayisafani2 that was banned from airing on the national 
broadcasters. The advert addressed many of the issues in the DA manifesto and 
brought a message of change that would bring six million jobs to South Africa. The 
video on YouTube, the video sharing platform, has been seen 330 000 times by the 
13 September 2014. Top tweets were: 
 
“You can still watch #Ayisafani2 here --> 	   https://www.youtube.com/	  watch?v=rsirDxI8xqU	  …” 
 
“@helenzille Back in Jozi: ANC claiming DA WCape spent R10-bill on 
consultants.But 97% of that was done by ANC b4 we took over in 2009. 
Expose ANC lies!” 
 
“@mandyldewaal The SABC bans EFF adverts. The SABC bans DA adverts. 
This is not a free nor fair election.” 
 
In May there was an increase in conversations about the DA, and there were 47 000 
online mentions of the DA. 2 283 of the comments were negative and 1 921 were 
positive. The top negative comment: 
 
“@KgosiLesedi My problem with the ANC, DA and EFF are the people at the 
helm of all these parties. Can't trust either of them for shit.” 
 
The top positive comment was: 
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“@abw1712: @Cohen328 @helenzille DA is the best. At least they don't use 
public money to improve there homes? Take that Zuma!,!” 
 
The biggest spikes in conversations were on 7 and 8 May. There were 8 023 mentions 
of the DA posted online on 7 May with 62% of the audience driving the conversations 
on the day being male. The top three most mentioned Twitter accounts on the day 
were @da_news, @helenzille and @da_gpl. 
 
The top two retweeted tweets were tweets by Helen Zille:  
 
“Why is it that the IEC ALWAYS seems to have logistical problems in DA 
strongholds. Hang in there, please. Your vote essential to SA future.” 
 
“if anyone has any queries/complaints about the voting process today, call the 
DA on 0861-22-55-32.” 
 
There were 9 398 mentions of the DA the day after the elections. There were 1 054 
male authors on the day and 633 female authors, with 231 of the mentions being 
positive: 
 
“@Jo_Cruse DA's fantastic growth in this election is worth taking a moment 
to appreciate- a phenomenal achievement. The road to 2019 starts here...” 
 
And 393 mentions were negative: 
 
“@ZaMoney_ Im disappointed in KZN thou, hw is DA the official opposition. 
U bloody sellouts” 
 
The top retweeted tweet (439) was:  
 
“@helenzille DA party agents at the count in the affected voting districts 
confirm that the ballots were counted. I accept their word for it. Audited.” 
 
News24.com posted articles about ballot papers that were found and this was shared 
195 times on Twitter:  
 
“DA ballots found dumped - report http://n24.cm/1m2oC6r	  “ 
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@da_news, @helenzille and @ewnupdates were the most mentioned accounts on 
Twitter on the day. Iol.co.za mentioned the DA 24 times on 8 May being the top news 
site to post. 
 
Some of the mentions: 
 
“@GvanOnselen The DA is in a real fight here to cling to 22%. Having 
spoken to many DA people, they were hoping for 24% or 25%. Even 26%. 
This will hurt.” 
 
“TimesLive: DA leads Joburg, ANC Gauteng” 
 
“EWN: Dumped ballot papers found in PTA” 
 
From 8 to 14 May there were 121 000 mentions of the DA online; 4 503 of the 
mentions were positive. 
 
“Let's make Excellent happen... @DAJohniDA @DAYouthNW @DA_News 
@Jo1Coetzee @TiaanK89” 
 
The biggest drivers of content online were around the Agang and DA coalition and 
the consequential breakdown it had and the Election Day results and possible ballot 
paper fraud.  
 
Comparing this with the criteria for success developed above, it is important to begin 
by stating that the DA had a much more integrated and well thought out campaign 
strategy online than the ANC. Their platforms communicated with each other, and 
were much more user friendly than that of the ANC.  
 
The www.da.org.za website is well designed and modern with the biography of the 
party and the leaders easy to find and easy to email or share on social media. The 
manifesto and main party issues are also well placed at the top of the page and easy to 
identify.  
 
Campaign news is also readily available on the website, and there is a special section 
created to educate users on the 2014 campaign. The DA also put a lot of focus on the 
campaign by creating a separate website called, lookingforwardto.co.za. This site was 
dedicated to the 2014 campaign and had useful tools, contact information, a Twitter 
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stream where users’ tweets were linked live. One of the smarter things on the 
dedicated website was the “free supporter’s toolkit”, which was a collection of 
downloadable Facebook and Twitter friendly images that had messages such as: “I’m 
#lookingforwardto a government that delivers”. The campaign pages also contained 
many videos, photos and a campaign calendar that made users feel involved and 
informed about the campaign.  
 
Links to other sites that support the campaign’s ideas and share its thoughts were also 
found on various pages on the website with links to social media platforms found on 
nearly all pages on the site. Donation information, contact information and the 
volunteer sign-up page is also well designed, and can, in the case of the sign-up page, 
be completed digitally.  
 
The DA were also very active when it came to building their communities online, 
with both the @Da_News and @Helenzille actively engaging with users regarding a 
wide range of subjects. This is one of the reasons behind the large followings the DA 
enjoys on new media platforms. They also made it easy to subscribe to the DA 
Newsletter, which regularly sent out communication regarding the campaign and 
highlighted other important party related news.  
 
Offline events were also supported with online communication; when there was a 
rally or an event held by the DA, or a protest as seen above in Johannesburg, the DA 
would tweet and post on Facebook about the event.  
 
Due to the diverse gender and race profile the DA enjoys, the communication that was 
sent out during the election reached, at various times, the different audiences in South 
Africa.  
 
The criteria for success created above listed the following requirements: 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
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The DA did very well when compared to the criteria for success listed above. They 
had a strong new media strategy that was supported with modern online platforms. 
They ensured that there was a consistent message and executed their strategy well. 
And managed to spread their message across the spectrum found in South Africa. A 
score of 45 out of 50 will thus be awarded, as they lose points for not having a 
stronger targeted communication strategy to motivate the youth to vote.  
 
The other 50 points, which are based on a subjective view of their new media 
strategy, are awarded as follows: 
 
Firstly, there is a clear overarching strategy visible when the DA’s new media 
strategy is analysed. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used 
well and integrated with each other. Campaign videos, with Mmusi Maimane, were 
posted on YouTube; these were linked to their website, and then shared on Facebook 
and Twitter.  
 
Secondly, their manner of communication with the electorate was efficient and 
constant. The failed Agang coalition and the communication regarding this part of the 
campaign trail was, however, extremely poorly managed and could have been dealt 
with better. The incidents where Helen Zille also posted comments on Twitter that 
created negative sentiment regarding the party could have been avoided.  
 
The social grouping representation (Dalton, 2014) is a big problem for the DA. The 
legacy of Tony Leon’s liberal white party has been broken down, but the DA still 
struggles to make inroads into the Black communities in the rest of the country. There 
was an evident attempt to tackle this problem by running an active Gauteng campaign 
where they held events that were well broadcasted onto new media platforms. These 
events, and the targeted communication campaign were all overshadowed, however, 
by the ‘White party’ stigma that still exists. With Helen Zille as the party leader the 
issues around race and apartheid will always make it hard for the DA to win over the 
Black, non Western Cape, voters.  
 
Finally, the DA did not make enough of an attempt to address youth apathy and 
instead focused on converting existing ANC supporters from outside of the Western 
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Cape to the DA. There should have been a stronger focus from the DA in the Western 
Cape to address voter apathy as this is the DA’s stronghold and one of the provinces 
with the highest amount of voter apathy.  
 
Due to these subjective reasons, and the analysis done in the criteria for success, the 
DA scores a 70 out of 100 for the way in which they used new media during the 2014 
South African national election. 
 
EFF and Julius Malema 
 
The Economic Freedom Fighters, EFF, is a new party that was founded in July 2013 
and ran for the first time in the 2014 election. The party founder and leader, Julius 
Malema, was a forceful president of the ANC Youth League from 2008 to 2012 but 
was expelled from the party in 2013. He is a well known newsmaker who holds very 
strong Communist beliefs and has a staunch rural following in South Africa. 
 
The EFF has a mobile responsive website that works well on mobile devices. The 
website has a large image at the top where the manifesto is very visible. A tactic that 
the EFF employed very well online was the ordering of merchandise, where they 
made it possible to order EFF branded items such as berets, caps, golf T-shirts, round-
neck T-shirts and magnetic stickers. These items can only be bought in large volumes 
of 100+.  
 
Malema has a strong online following, with 526 000 followers on Twitter, but he does 
not have a Facebook page.  
 
There were 38 000 mentions of Malema online from 1 February to 12 May 2014 and 
Twitter was the top most used platform to talk about Malema.	  Only 2 071 mentions of 
the 38 000 were negative comments about Malema.	  
 
On 4 May when members gathered at the Lucas Moripe Stadium in Atteridgeville for 
the EFF's #TshelaThupa rally, conversations about Malema spiked with over 3 500 
mentions of him. Some of the comments are: 
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“@loyisogola Malema is a bankrupt man telling us about managing a 
country's finances. This dude has lost his mind. Sort out your own finance 
first.” 
 
“Julius Malema is headed for Parliament. At this point the EFF have 103 575 
votes which translates into 2 seats so far” 
 
“No suits and ties for EFF” 
“#Malema: Helen Zille is a racist. When they march it's black people. When 
they go have dinner, it's white people. #TshelaThupa” 
 
The EFF manifesto highlights the following in its paper: 
• Land expropriation without compensation for development, land and agrarian 
reform 
• Nationalisation of mines 
• Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action  
• Education and Training 
• Healthcare 
• Housing, Sanitation, Roads and Transport 
• Safety and Security 
• Youth Development 
• Social Grants 
• Fighting Corruption 
• Adequate Salaries and Working Conditions for all Public Servants 
• One Capital City for South Africa.  
 
The EFF has 50 000 Followers on Twitter on 13 September and tweets under the 
handle, @EconFreedomZA. They have 94 000 likes on their Facebook page. The EFF 
also brought out a YouTube video that attracted 209 000 views. The video does not 
discuss any political issues or make promises; it shines a light on the Marikana 
massacre where many mine workers were shot by the police and the Nkandla 
corruption of Jacob Zuma and the ANC (Staff, 2014h).   
 
The EFF had 70 000 mentions online from 1 February to 12 May. 3 317 of the 
comments were negative and 65% of the audience that posted about EFF online 
during that period were male. The top negative post: 
 
“@LindiMazibuko @MbalulaFikile he is sad because an intelligent young 
lady is leaving parli and they're now going to deal will fools from EFF” 
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There were three spikes in conversations about the EFF in April. 23 000 mentions of 
EFF were posted in April and 1 294 of the mentions were negative. On 3 April the 
#702ElectionDebate took place and there were over 400 comments that mentioned the 
EFF on the day:  
  
“Harris wants to tackle the tripartite alliance. He may be referring to Mmusi, 
Lindiwe and Helen. #702ElectionDebate #VoteEFF” 
 
Another trend on the day was the #YLManifestos which consisted of only 16 
mentions of EFF: 
 
“What does the @EconFreedomZA manifesto say about economic activity? 
#YLManifestos pic.twitter.com/tWKgwoQXyK” 
 
There were different conversations on 10 April and these were the trends that stood 
out: 
 
“A trust has been launched to collect funds to settle EFF leader Julius 
Malema's R16-million Sars bill” 
 
“EFF member Wiekus Kotze arrested” 
 
“Its clear now that Irvin Jim is a fighter at heart, its only a matter of time we 
welcome him in his rightful home, EFF. #DMGathering” 
 
On 22 April there were over a thousand mentions of the EFF; conversations were 
about the banned EFF advert: 
 
“@SABreakingNews: Icasal receives EFF advert complaint 
http://bit.ly/1flDtDo ” 
 
“@SABreakingNews: Banned EFF ad goes viral: The EFF's TV advert that 
was banned from SABC has gone viral onlin... http://bit.ly/1txuTuq” 
 
There were 2 218 mentions of EFF posted online on 29 April. 73% of the audience 
that mentioned EFF on the day were male and 27% were female. @power987news 
was the second most mentioned Twitter account on the day, mentioning EFF in 20 
tweets and being retweeted 177 times. The EFF Twitter account was the top most 
mentioned with 487 mentions. 
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“Hundreds of Economic Freedom Fighters’ supporters crowded Empire Road in 
Parktown, Johannesburg, ahead of their planned march to the SABC” 
 
There were 36 000 mentions of EFF online from 1 May to 12 May. 34 504 of the 
conversations took place on Twitter; iol.co.za posted 147 times about EFF.  
 
On 7 May there were 4 856 mentions of EFF online; mybroadband.co.za was the 
second most active site and mentioned the EFF 22 times. Twitter was the most active 
with 4 691 mentions. 66% of the audience talking about EFF 7 May were male 
authors. @news24 was the third most mentioned account when talking about EFF on 
Twitter with the EFF account and @julius_s_malema being first and second. 
 
Some of the comments: 
 
“The first results are in; our database should be live on all platforms shortly. 
ANC: 148, APC: 1, DA: 3, EFF: 5, PAC: 1, UDM: 2” 
 
“A voting station opened 30 mins late in Sterkspruit after an EFF agent found 
ballot boxes full of ballot papers. @Dispatch_DD #ddvote14” 
 
There were 19 000 mentions of EFF online with 922 positive mentions after the 
elections. The majority of the mentions were on 8 May with over 8 000 mentions 
online; 352 comments were positive with the top ones being:  
 
“Real winner in the elections it must be said is @Julius_S_Malema and his 
@EconFreedomZA think they surprised us all, job well done Fighters”. 
 
“A beautiful piece by Fighter Ziyana on choosing EFF http://mg.co.za/	  article/2014-­‐05-­‐07-­‐soapbox-­‐a-­‐personal-­‐tale-­‐of-­‐virginity-­‐and-­‐heartbreak	  …” 
 
“EFF donates R50 000 to Marikana Strike Fund. today kwaLanga EFF stops 
eviction of family from their house by greedy banks and DA. Asijiki” 
 
“EFF have done well, they must chin up - they didnt embarass theirselves. 
Wresting away power is a marathon... #Elections2014” 
 
These were some of negative mentions:  
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“I'm not surprised dat EFF got an appalling 3 percent nationally after making 
so much noise but they will learn that insults don't win voters” 
 
“Lol lmao...cope failed too, that's not a first time."@NkanyeziKubheka: LOL 
RT @Khule101: Suddenly no one supports #EFF on my TL......" 
 
“We can identify how many village idiots we have in SA just by counting all 
the EFF votes. #humanityfail #Elections2014” 
 
Comparing this with the criteria for success developed above, it is important to begin 
by stating that the EFF had a much more integrated and well thought out campaign 
strategy online than the ANC. Their platforms communicated with each other, and 
were much more user friendly than that of the ANC.  
 
The effighters.org.za website is well designed and modern with the biography of the 
party easily accessible in the ‘about us’ section on the website. The party leaders’ 
information is not, however, very detailed, with only the name, surname and role in 
the party listed on the website. This is quite an oversight when the fact that the EFF is 
built around the Julius Malema brand is considered. The manifesto and main party 
issues are also well placed at the top of the page and easy to identify, but these are not 
shareable on social media.  
 
Campaign news is also readily available on the website, but there is no dedicated 
campaign section to educate possible voters on where campaign events will take 
place. One of the smarter things on the website is the free downloadable “Jazz Hour” 
which is a collection of downloadable MP3s for anyone to download and share. This 
unique content meant that those who were not necessarily interested in the EFF were 
also exposed to their website, message and party because they went to the website to 
find the free, downloadable music. 
 
Links to other sites that support the campaign’s ideas and share its thoughts were also 
found on various pages on the website with links to social media platforms found on 
some pages on the website. Donation information, contact information and the 
volunteer sign-up page is well designed, and can, in the case of the sign-up page, be 
completed digitally.  
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The EFF were also active when it came to building their communities online, but 
there is no clear communication strategy across the platforms or between the profiles. 
Julius Malema eclipses his party’s Twitter following, and even his inactive Facebook 
page has nearly 100 000 more followers than that of the official EFF Facebook page. 
There is a lot of room for them to improve on this front. There is also no newsletter or 
targeted email campaign strategy visible.  
 
Offline events, however, are well supported with online communication, where most 
media events and campaign activities are posted online with pictures and even videos 
in some cases.  
 
The criteria for success created above listed the following requirements: 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
 
The EFF did well when compared to the criteria for success listed above. They had a 
new media strategy that was supported with modern online platforms. They did not, 
however, ensure that there was a consistent message and were very reactive when it 
came to posting content. There was also a very strong drive towards the lower income 
and rural audience in South Africa, and this did not talk to the multiple possible 
audience discussed above. A score of 20 out of 50 will thus be awarded.  
 
The other 50 points, which are based on a subjective view of their new media 
strategy, are awarded as follows: 
 
Firstly, there was no clear overarching strategy visible when the EFF’s new media 
strategy is analysed. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used, 
and Julius Malema’s strong following was actively engaged to drive audiences to the 
various other platforms, but it was not well integrated. Campaign videos, with Julius 
Malema, were posted on YouTube, and this was linked to their website, but it was not 
often shared on Facebook and Twitter. The production quality was low and the 
campaign messages were poorly executed.  
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Secondly, their manner of communication with the electorate could have been 
improved. The rallies and offline events, as well as the many other media events that 
were held, could have been moved online and discussed by the party to ensure that 
these events received more amplification, as seen above.  
 
What is important to note is that when the EFF is considered within the framework of 
social groups they did succeed in driving a directed campaign strategy that spoke 
clearly to the poor and lower income Black voters who were dealigned from COPE 
and IFP, but were too conservative to vote for the DA or one of the other opposition 
parties.  
 
Thus, the EFF, out of all the parties listed here, did the most to address youth apathy 
and focus on converting unaligned or dealigned COPE supporters from the rural areas 
to their party. The informal and seemingly unplanned new media strategy followed by 
the EFF must appeal to the youth as there are many younger voices sharing and 
engaging with the EFF on their Facebook and Twitter profiles.  
 
Due to these subjective reasons, and the analysis done in the criteria for success, the 
EFF scores a 50 out of 100 for the way in which they used new media during the 2014 
South African national election. 
 
COPE and Mosiuoa Lekota 
 
The Congress of the People (COPE) is a party that was formed before the previous 
1999 election and had very high profile leaders. The COPE website is found at 
congressofthepeople.org.za  
 
Mosiuoa Lekota has been the leader of COPE since 2008. His Facebook page has 674 
followers and he has 5 147 followers on Twitter.  
 
There were 2 989 mentions of Mosiuoa Lekota from 1 February to 12 May. 7% of 
mentions of Mosiuoa Lekota were negative and he was mentioned specifically 
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because he said publicly that he would eat his hat if he garnered fewer votes in the 
2014 election than he did in 2009:  
 
“@ewnreporter #Elections2014 Cope Pres Mosiua Lekota eats his hat after his 
party failed to garner the same votes it did in 2009.LN” 
 
The hashtag #lekota was used 37 times in conversations and @terrorlekota was 
mentioned 681 times on Twitter; 299 of the mentions were retweets. 
 
On 28 April @GarethCliff retweeted a tweet that mentioned Lekota, Gareth has 
641 897 followers: 
 
“@ChristineQunta Now that Smuts quit COPE can the last man standing 
(Lekota) switch off” 
 
The party manifesto enjoys only a small link on the homepage of the website and is 
not easy to find. They state that the following is of key importance: 
 
• Growing the economy and sustainable development 
• A World Class Education System 
• Universal Healthcare 
• Fighting Crime and Ensuring Safety and Security for All 
 
COPE has 2 700 Facebook fans on 13 September and 2 000 followers on Twitter.  
 
There were 14 000 mentions of COPE from 1 February to 12 May. There was a 
minimum of 40 mentions per day and on 7 May there were over 700 mentions; the 
majority of the mentions of the party were in relation to other parties. 
 
The topic “TeamCOPESA” was used in some of the conversations about COPE; 
people who used the words TeamCOPESA in conversation were 19% female and 
81% male. Some of the mentions on 7 May:  
 
“@Refie94_Lee Seems like COPE ain't copying though” 
 
“@Exclusive_Oscar nd will forevr be a joke!...cum nxt elections it'll b lyk 
COPE” 
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“@Thabiso_Dlamini: Gauteng Latest Results: ANC 50.47%, DA 29.91%, 
COPE 0.43%, IFP 2.15%, EFF 8.49%, Others 8.56%.” 
 
After the election there were 4 849 mentions of COPE and 297 of the mentions of 
COPE were negative: 
 
“@The_Leong_King just watched the most disturbing & disgusting 
video!ANC mob brutally murder a COPE supporter!Free & fair 
elections?Democracy?#Elections2014” 
 
There were 92 positive mentions:  
 
“@MTshwete COPE did much better than the in 2009 election! Who knows 
maybe Julius will be the one eating his beret in 2019. Watch the SPACE!” 
 
The majority of the conversations took place on 7 May and after 8 May there were far 
fewer conversations about the party. Top retweeted tweet with 553 retweets: 
 
“@IECSouthAfrica National Assembly seats: APC–1; PAC–1; AGANG SA–
2; ACDP–3; AIC–3; COPE –3; UDM–4; VF Plus–4; NFP–6; IFP–10; EFF–
25; DA–89; ANC–249.” 
 
Iol.co.za was the top news site to post about COPE, posting 58 articles that mention 
COPE. 
Comparing this with the criteria for success developed above, it is important to begin 
by stating that the COPE website is modern and mobile responsive, but it is very 
sparse in content, and could be made much more user friendly. The biography of the 
party and the leaders is easy to find but does not have pictures, and it cannot be 
emailed or shared on social media. The manifesto is only visible on the main page and 
the party issues could also be made more accessible from other pages.  
 
Campaign news is readily available on the website, but there are very few articles 
available and the news is generally about the party’s ‘successes’ and does not delve 
into salient party issues or topical South African issues.  
 
Links to other sites that support the campaign’s ideas and share its thoughts were also 
found on various pages on the website with links to social media platforms also 
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visible, but there could be much deeper integration. Donation information, contact 
information and the volunteer sign-up page are poorly designed, and can, in the case 
of the sign-up page, only be completed by printing out a form.  
 
COPE also failed to build their communities online, with both the @teamCOPESA 
and @TerrorLekota engaging very infrequently; and the manner in which they 
communicate is impersonal, contains links to Facebook, when posting on Twitter, and 
very little information that users can share or engage with. With COPE, it may even 
be better for them not to have a social media presence: the way they are currently 
running their new media strategy does more harm than good as the perception of their 
being a lacklustre party with no communication strategy is being created.  
 
Offline events were also not supported with online communication; if there was a 
rally or an event held by COPE, there would not be a picture or video about it.  
 
COPE also failed to address any markets directly with their communication. This was 
due to their being extremely race and class aware, and trying to avoid the subject 
completely. 
 
The criteria for success created above listed the following requirements: 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
 
COPE did well when compared to the criteria for success listed regarding the website 
analysis above. But they failed to have a strong new media strategy to support their 
modern online platforms. There was no engagement strategy in their communication 
and this meant that they failed to grow their online community, and failed to drive 
offline activities. They also failed to target any audiences specifically, either on social 
media or through email newsletters. A score of 15 out of 50 will thus be awarded.  
 
The other 50 points, which are based on a subjective view of their new media 
strategy, are awarded as follows: 
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Firstly, there was no clear overarching strategy visible. Platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube were used poorly, on their own as well as to support each other. 
Campaign videos were posted on Facebook, and not on their website, which means 
that they only lived on one place, making the possible audience much smaller.  
 
Secondly, the manner of communication with the electorate was poor. The COPE 
team often posted only a Facebook link on Twitter, with no context around it. These 
tweets were not retweeted or favourited, not even by the party leader’s Twitter 
profiles. There is a lot of room for improvement when it comes to COPE’s new media 
communication strategy.  
 
When this is related to the discussions above regarding Dalton’s (2014) social group 
model and representation it is clear that there is a big need for the COPE party, and its 
leaders, to create an identity that voters can relate to. There were too few comments, 
posts or tweets that related to the identity of the party, what values it stood for or 
whom it represented in South Africa. The party leaders also created confusion by 
being very ‘liberal’ in their personal online presences, which would, when the more 
traditional and conservative voter demographic of South Africa is considered, push 
more voters away than it would attract.  
 
Finally, COPE did not attempt to address youth apathy or focus on harvesting 
dealigned voters to support them. The party was very middle of the road, and focused 
heavily on attracting possible dealigned voters, but they did not succeed in presenting 
themselves as a more organised or stronger party than the ANC or any of the other 
parties.  
 
Due to these subjective reasons, and the analysis done in the criteria for success, the 
COPE campaign scores a 30 out of 100 for the way in which they used new media 
during the 2014 South African national election. 
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Agang and Mamphela Ramphele 
 
The former anti-apartheid activist Mamphela Ramphele formed Agang in February of 
2013. Agang (meaning ‘let us build’ in Sotho-Tswana). The AgangSA.org website 
has been unreachable for most of the campaign period and after the election it was 
turned off and has not been reachable since. There is a new website listed on the 
Agang SA Twitter page, but not on their Facebook page, agangsa-taskteam.org 
(2014), but this site now has on its homepage: 
 
This site no longer represents Agang SA. The task team members have 
resigned, and are moving on to a new civic organization that will focus on 
Agang values, and move away from political representation, which has proved 
to be a poison that has stopped us from focusing on what we should care 
about: the daily problems of ordinary people. 
 
Mamphela Ramphele is a medical doctor, former activist against apartheid, an 
academic and businesswomen. She has had two children with Steve Biko. She has 
50 000 followers on Twitter, but she does not have a Facebook page. Facebook does 
state that 3 000 people like her as a topic.  
 
There were 10 000 mentions of Mamphela Ramphele from 1 February to 12 May. The 
top retweeted tweet with 361 retweets was posted by @vuyo_mvoko, and he has over 
10 000 followers: 
 
“#zille on Ramphele: I offered her the world, she wanted the universe, she's 
ended up with a shack in poffader #sabcnews #morninglive” 
 
There were peaks in conversations about Mamphela on 3 February, 10 April and 
8 May. The peak on 3 May was because of the split between Mamphela’s party and 
the DA; majority of comments were negative. The biggest peak in conversation was 
on 10 April and this was because of different articles and the two debates that took 
place on the day: 
 
“DA, ANC ignoring coloured people - Ramphele: Agang SA leader 
Mamphela Ramphele says that neither the DA nor th... http://bit.ly/1eciGGS	   “ 
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“#DMGathering Zwelenzima Vavi, Hellen Zille, Mamphela Rampele, Malusi 
Gigaba on the #Election panel discussion” 
 
“@GwedeMantashe1 vs @MamphelaR live on @eNCAnews #WitsDebate 
#20YearsofDemocracy” 
 
Their manifesto focuses on five key topics: empowerment, education, 
entrepreneurship, employment, and effective governance. These are explained as: 
• To see empowerment measured less in terms of scorecards and more in terms 
of inputs such as quality schooling, effective government and quality 
healthcare. 
• Introduce a 50% minimum pass mark for all subject and grades, while teachers 
would face competency tests to determine their pay increases and bonuses. 
• Slash red tape entangling small businesses, make changes to the tax system 
and strengthen competition law that would eliminate barriers to entry. 
• Focus on skills would convert some public schools to vocational training, with 
additional funds for on-the-job training for youths trying to enter the 
workforce. 
• “Putting citizens first” by, for example, stopping corruption, demilitarising the 
police and getting private doctors to run clinics. 
 
Agang has 34 700 followers on Facebook on 13 September and 47 000 on Twitter. 
The agangsa.org.za website was offline while this study’s analysis was being done.  
From 1 February to 12 May there were 21 000 mentions posted online about Agang. 
There was a spike in conversations on 3 February with 1 580 mentions of Agang. 
 
“Ramphele and Zille: The end of the affair”  
 
The news that drove conversation on 3 February: there were negative comments 
posted by people on the day and jokes were made about the split. 1 439 comments on 
the day were posted on Twitter, 70% of the audience posting on the day were male. 
News sites, blogs, forums and Twitter were filled with different comments and 
articles about the news. News24 posted a tweet that was retweeted 17 times:  
  
“Zille says she realised there was a problem when she saw Ramphele's redraft 
of her statement. MR wanted to remain Agang leader...” 
 
The second spike in mentions of Agang was on 31 March with over 1 400 mentions. 
On the day there were 317 negative mentions posted. There were posts being made by 
the Agang Twitter account; and there was a post about Jacob Zuma by Agang’s 
Twitter account:  
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People on social media believed that the Agang Twitter account was hacked; however 
a news article on New24 confirmed that Agang’s account was not hacked:  
 
“AgangSA on tweets: There's no polite way to say it http://www.news24.com/Elections/News/AgangSA-­‐reacts-­‐Theres-­‐no-­‐polite-­‐way-­‐to-­‐say-­‐it-­‐20140331 “ 
 
There were 1 317 posts of Agang on the day of the elections and 2 277 the day after 
the elections. On 7 May the top retweeted tweet was a tweet by @justicemalala with 
245 retweets and 35 favourites: 
  
“@AgangSA: citizen @MamphelaR busted an official with ballot papers in 
her hands. #IECMustAnswer pic.twitter.com/5J09Yj774p”What!!??”  
 
After the election there were 2 277 mentions of Agang online on 8 May; 66% of the 
audience posting about the party were male and 2 174 of the mentions were from 
Twitter. Overall there were 4 240 mentions of Agang online after the elections. The 
most mentioned Twitter accounts were @agangsa, @iecsouthafrica and @mamphelar 
and the most popular tweet was retweeted 553 times:  
 
“National Assembly seats: APC–1; PAC–1; AGANG SA–2; ACDP–3; AIC–
3; COPE –3; UDM–4; VF Plus–4; NFP–6; IFP–10; EFF–25; DA–89; ANC–
249..”  
 
The hashtag #elections2014 was used 421 times when mentioning Agang on Twitter 
post elections. Iol.co.za was the top site to mention Agang, mentioning the party 36 
times. 
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It is difficult to compare the Agang website with the criteria for success developed 
above since there is no website to measure or compare. The second website, agangsa-
taskteam.org, has also been abandoned and paints a very poor picture of the party.  
 
During the campaign period, however, Agang did very well in building a following 
online. They joined Facebook on 15 February and by election time they had already 
amassed 30 000 followers on Facebook and 40 000 followers on Twitter. Mamphela 
had amassed over 50 000 Twitter followers. There was a very active engagement 
strategy where they made sure to post unique and original content on the individual 
platforms and also to drive conversations between these, thus growing a solid base in 
a relatively short period of time.  
 
Offline events were also well covered and supported by their social media platforms, 
with videos, pictures and quotes being sent on the day of the event.  
 
Agang did well to talk to the more educated, female middle class citizen in South 
Africa and would have done much better were it not for the missteps with the DA and 
the uncertainty regarding the party funding and Mamphela’s long term party 
commitment.  
 
The criteria for success created above listed the following requirements: 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
 
Agang did well to build an online community and drive offline support from there, 
but was lacking when it came to their targeted campaigns. The website issues were 
also unnecessary. There was, however, at the inception of the campaign a strong focus 
on communicating with the youth, as well as on driving a conversation with the many 
audiences in South Africa. A score of 35 out of 50 will thus be awarded.  
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The other 50 points, which are based on a subjective view of their new media 
strategy, are awarded as follows: 
 
Firstly, there was an overarching strategy visible where the various platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used well and supported each other to drive 
audiences to them. 
 
Secondly, the manner of their communication with the electorate was effective and 
frequent. The Agang team often posted unique content on the various platforms and 
made sure that the posts were relevant and would engage with the users.  
 
When the speed at which the new media uptake happened on Agang’s platforms is 
considered, the projected impact on the election outcome should have been much 
higher; the reason it wasn’t is due to, under more, the factor of viable voting 
populations.  
 
Agang focused on targeting the middle to higher income earner with an interest in 
“New Party” rhetoric. From what was seen above regarding the viable voting 
populations in South Africa, the average group voter is still poor, uneducated and 
religious. This means that even though Agang were well received by the mass media 
and their average voter, many of their digital consumers were probably aligned with 
the DA and had little reason to leave the DA for Agang.  
 
Finally, Agang made an effort to talk to the youth and the dealigned, and to motivate 
people to vote. Unfortunately, near the end of the campaign period, the Agang party 
was in shambles and they had lost most of the supporters they had garnered during the 
campaign period. 
 
Due to these subjective reasons, and the analysis done in the criteria for success, the 
Agang campaign scores a 60 out of 100 for the way in which they used new media 
during the 2014 South African national election. 
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Patriotic Alliance and Kenny Kunene 
 
The Patriotic Alliance (PA) was formed in November 2013 by, among others, Gayton 
McKenzie and Kenny Kunene.  
 
Kenny Kunene is a high profile businessman; he has 53 500 fans on Facebook and 
178 000 followers on Twitter on 13 September.  
 
There were 3 456 mentions of Kenny Kunene from 1 February to 12 May 2014. The 
majority of the conversations were related to the comedy central roast of Kenny 
Kunene and most of the audience who spoke about Kenny Kunene online were male 
with 63%. 
 
Even though the elections were on 7 May the peak in conversation that mentioned 
Kenny Kunene was on 28 April. The top hashtag used in relation to Kenny and 
elections was the #politicaledge and this was used in 33 tweets with 14 of the tweets 
being retweets. 
 
Only 20 tweets with the #election2014 mentioned Kenny Kunene. Iol.co.za was the 
top site to mention Kenny Kunene; iol.co.za posted 38 articles that mentioned Kenny 
and the majority of the mentions were related to his political party. 
 
Some of the mentions: 
 
“Am watching that idiot“@Lebza_Chivas: Kenny Kunene on #dstv404 
#ElectionDebate”” 
 
“We must stop politics of personalities: Kenny Kunene - SundayWorld http://www.sundayworld.co.za/news/2014/05/08/we-­‐must-­‐stop-­‐politics-­‐of-­‐personalities-­‐kenny-­‐kunene … via @SundayWorldZA” 
 
“@LuckyBlackmamba @Kenny_T_Kunene @PAparty2014 the only party he 
can host is a sushi party not a political party!” 
 
“Well done to @Kenny_T_Kunene @Kennyand his Party. 8000+votes. For a 
1st time that's good” 
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The PA manifesto emphasises the empowerment of previously disadvantaged people 
in South Africa through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Affirmative 
Action (AA). It is concerned with: 
• Employment Equity 
• The Fishing Industry 
• Decent Housing and Sanitation 
• Industrialisation  
• Banking and Credit  
• Education 
• National Healthcare 
• Corruption-free Government 
• Land Reform 
 
There were 947 mentions of PA online from 1 February to 12 May and 3% of the 
mentions were negative:  
 
“@Saint_LK: Patriotic Alliance is a useless party man... hehehehe, they can't 
even get 20 000 votes from Isikhothanes #electionresults #Elections2014” 
 
The top three sites to mention the party were: Twitter (688), iol.co.za (44) and 
citizen.co.za (21). There was a peak in conversations on 24 April and this was 
because the EFF leader Julius Malema responded to an open letter by Gayton 
McKenzie : 
 
“#Letter Speaking to @RediTlhabi, EFF leader Julius Malema responds to 
Patriotic Alliance president Gayton McKenzie.” 
 
“@Cybooh so Gayton McKenzie, Patriotic Alliance President wrote dat letter 
2 Julius Malema EFF. & replies naye futhi!! yah neh..” 
 
There were only 59 mentions of the party on the day of the elections. There were 224 
mentions of the party the day after elections. The EconFreedomZA tweeted about the 
PA on 8 May: the tweet was retweeted 16 times; and there were 16 favourites and 18 
comments on the post: 
 
“@EconFreedomZA: Patriotic Alliance has 7 votes from Gauteng. They're 
from Gayton, Kenny and their girlfriends.” 
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After the election there were 296 mentions and conversations were male driven (37 
authors). The top retweeted tweet after the elections was a tweet by @sentletse:  
 
“@Sentletse Patriotic Alliance must consolidate the night-club business and 
leave politics to politicians.” 
 
Some of the comments: 
 
“Rude :'D "@Vusani_: LMAO RT @EconFreedomZA: Patriotic Alliance has 
7 votes from Gauteng. They're from Gayton, Kenny and their girlfriends." 
 
Iol News: “Kunene advocates ‘politics of policies’” 	  
Comparing this with the set of criteria for success that was developed, the PA scores 
as follows:  
 
The website analysis based on Kluver, does not do well. The biographies of the party 
and its leaders are available, but are not easy to find and not well produced. The party 
information, for example, references Wikipedia as its source. The manifesto and 
campaign news are visible on the homepage, but the campaign news is held on a 
different site, patrioticalliancenews.blogspot.com, which means that it is hard for 
users to find, and creates a bad user experience. It is also important to note that the 
users who follow a shared news link to this site will not know that there is another site 
for the party, and there is no indication of this on the website. There are links to other 
sites that support the campaign’s ideas and share its thoughts as well as links to social 
media platforms Facebook and Twitter. There is an option to donate via EFT and 
multiple ways to contact the party. There is a volunteer sign-up page, but the 
documents that are needed have to be sent via post or fax. There is very little available 
in terms of campaign events or photos and no easily accessible campaign calendar.  
 
There was no targeted marketing campaign that could be subscribed to or found on 
the website. The Twitter campaign that was used made it possible for users to easily 
receive communication from the PA, but the communication was done poorly and on 
a very ad hoc basis. 
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During the campaign period the PA did poorly in building a following online. They 
joined Facebook on 3 December 2013 and by election time had fewer than 1 000 
followers on Facebook or on Twitter. The party leaders, Gayton McKenzie and 
Kenny Kunene, had 50 000 and 190 000 followers on Twitter, respectively. These 
audiences were not, however, driven to the PA or followed them due to their party 
affiliation. Both Kunene and McKenzie are well known for other reasons outside of 
politics.  
 
Offline events were thus poorly covered by their social media platforms, with some 
videos, pictures and quotes being sent, but these were infrequent and did not work as 
an amplification tool.  
 
The PA did well to talk to the Coloured community in the Western Cape, when they 
held events and focused their communication, but were not able to move voters away 
from the DA.  
 
The criteria for success created above listed the following requirements: 
• Website analysis based on Kluver: 10 points. 
• A targeted marketing campaign: 10 points. 
• Communication tool to build an audience: 10 points. 
• Community tool to drive offline activations: 10 points. 
• South Africa focused to address dual online audiences: 10 points. 
 
The PA did not do well when it came to building an online community or driving 
offline support from there, and was lacking when it came to having a targeted 
campaign. Their website strategy was very poor. A score of 15 out of 50 will thus be 
awarded.  
 
The other 50 points, which are based on the subjective view of their new media 
strategy, are awarded as follows: 
 
Firstly, there was no overarching strategy visible; the various platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were not used well and did not support each other to 
drive audiences to them. 
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Secondly, the manner of their communication with the electorate was ineffective and 
ad hoc. The PA team often posted links to Facebook on Twitter without giving a 
context or considering the users that needed to read the tweets. There was also a lack 
of focus regarding the party’s communication strategy and whom they were targeting 
with the content they posted online. The political leaders were mostly at fault due to 
their split personas: on the one hand they concentrated on driving personal agendas, 
while on the other hand they promoted party principles – and the two approaches 
were not always aligned. The easy-going position that they adopted, with Kunene and 
McKenzie each parading their promiscuous behaviour publicly, meant that a large 
majority of the voting population could not align themselves with either the PA or the 
party leader. 
 
Finally, although the PA did make an effort to talk to the youth and the dealigned, and 
to motivate people to vote, this was poorly done and was not effective. Unfortunately, 
the party leaders were more invested in their personal projects than they were with the 
party, which means that there was no clear figurehead or clear party message being 
broadcast. 
 
Due to these subjective reasons, and the analysis done in the criteria for success, the 
PA campaign scores a 40 out of 100 for the way in which they used new media during 




From this overview of the way the political parties and their party leaders 
communicated during the 2014 national election in South Africa a few trends have 
emerged.  
 
The political parties in South Africa have invested in improving their digital 
communication through running dedicated social media channels on Twitter and in 
most cases on Facebook and YouTube. They have also invested in their websites to 
ensure that they are mobile friendly and have relevant content available. They have 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   109	  
also placed a lot of effort into ensuring that their manifestos are easily accessible and 
consumable.  
 
The communication that they have running on their various pages does not, however, 
have such a clear strategy in place. Most of the social media platforms that were used 
were mainly employed reactively.  
 
The scoreboard from the analysis above is as follows: 
1. DA: (45,25)   70/100 
2. ANC: (30, 30)  60/100 
3. AGANG: (35,25)  60/100 
4. EFF: (20, 30)  50/100 
5. PA: (15,25)  40/100 
6. COPE: (15,15) 30/100 
 
This chapter shows that on the one hand there is a lot that can be done to improve the 
way in which new media is used by the South African political parties. On the other 
hand, there are opportunities to win over voters by using new media in a smart and 
strategic way, as witnessed in the previous chapters. It is also clear that the research 
that can be done regarding how new media is used during elections in South Africa is 
only beginning and that there is an exciting period of data-rich analysis coming to the 
field of political science.  
 
Consider, for example, that only a small fraction of what was done in the 2008 Obama 
campaign has been used by the political parties in South Africa; consider too the 
speed at which new media platforms are developing and being adopted in South 
Africa. This means that there is a large evolving online audience and a multitude of 
potential ways to engage with it. 
 
The content the parties placed online was quite similar – manifestos along with the 
party leaders’ information – and, apart from the EFF, the content they chose to put on 
Twitter was not targeted: it did not address the youth apathy trend or break into 
specific sub-groups to ensure that dealigned voters were garnered. The EFF took a 
strong position on subjects such as nationalism and focused on the youth; this meant 
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that they were very popular in specific sub-groups and managed to garner the third 
most votes in the election.  
 
Parties are also failing to create opinion forming and party-centric conversations with 
the media or celebrities or individuals with large audiences to drive their party 
specific agendas. As seen above, voters will adopt the ‘issues’ the media raises as 
their own, so without this conversion there is very little informed reasons why voters 
should move from one party to the other. One way a party can resolve this is through 
active online debates between the press and the party leaders.  
 
As internet penetration continues to grow in South Africa, the international trend of 
party dealignment and party disillusionment will grow in South Africa and one of the 
most important places voters will go to find an alternative party will be online. It will 
thus be imperative for parties to establish large and well-managed digital audiences.  
 
It is clear from this analysis that there is a lot of room for political parties to improve 
their new media strategy. They need to both develop the way in which they approach 
the targeted and selected sub-groups that appeal to them and to also maintain a clear 
multi-platform communication strategy that speaks to party's	   faithful	  core	  voters	  and	  potential	  voters.	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Chapter 5 – Conclusion  	   
This paper has set out to answer the question: How was new media used in the 2014 
South African national election? To answer this question various aspects regarding 
new media, electioneering and the parties and political players involved in the 
election were analysed.  
 
Firstly, the context surrounding the topic of new media was created to ensure that 
there existed parameters within which the question could be framed. The short history 
of new media was used to create the outline for the question and this was coloured in 
with how politics in general was affected by new media and electioneering 
specifically. Three case studies – the 2008 Obama campaign, along with the 2014 
Indian and Brazilian elections – were used to highlight other aspects of how new 
media has impacted on electioneering and political campaigns. The work by Russell 
Dalton from his book, Citizen Politics, was used to frame the question within the 
context of electioneering. From this a set of criteria for success was created to make it 
possible to provide a measurable answer to the question of whether new media was 
used well or not. 
 
Secondly, South Africa’s media and new media histories were captured as well as a 
short history of elections in South Africa. This made it possible to better understand 
the South African landscape and refine the set of criteria for success to ensure that it 
worked in the context of a South African election and demographic.  
 
Finally, the set of criteria for success was used to gauge how well the political parties 
and leaders used new media in the 2014 South African election. This was done by 
analysing the parties and their leaders against the set of criteria for success; and by 
adding to that a subjective weighting based on the perception created by the parties 
and their leaders through their engagement with potential voters on these new media 
platforms.  
 
The scores which offer some answers to the research question ‘How was new media 
used in the 2014 South African national election?’ can be ranked as follows: 
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1. DA: (45,35)   70/100 
2. ANC: (30, 30)  60/100 
3. AGANG: (35,25)  60/100 
4. EFF: (20, 30)  50/100 
5. PA: (15,25)  40/100 
6. COPE: (15,15) 30/100 
From this it is clear that only the DA used new media well in the 2014 election. This 
was followed by the ANC and Agang, who made use of it but left a lot of room for 
improvement on their strategies and execution. The EFF, who made poor use of new 
media, has the most to gain from running a smarter new media campaign. There are 
currently few leaders with the following Julius Malema has, and there is a strong 
support base for the EFF when the party outcomes for the 2014 election are compared 
(IEC, 2014): 
1. ANC: (11 million votes)   62% (3.75 down) 
2. DA: (4 million votes)   22% (4.62 up) 
3. EFF: (1 million votes)   6% (new party) 
4. IFP: (441 854 votes)   2% (2.15 down) 
5. NFP: (288 742 votes)   1.5% (new party) 
6. UDM: (184 636 votes)  1% (.16 up) 
7. FFP: (165 715 votes)   .9% (.07 up) 
8. COPE: (123 235 votes)   .67% (6.75 down) 
9. ACDP: (104 039)    .57% (.24 down) 
10. AIC: (104 039)   .53% (new party) 
11. AGANG: (52 350)   .28% (new party) 
 
The Patriotic Alliance came 20th in the polls and scored as follows: 
PA: (13 263 votes)   .07% (new party) 
The overall use of new media in the 2014 South African national election was rather 
poor, and when the other parties that were not measured in this study are taken into 
account, this evaluation becomes even worse. 
 
In general the political parties and their leaders need to dramatically examine what 
their new media strategy is and ensure that they improve on the way they 
communicate with their voters, drive offline communication, and especially focus on 
creating websites that are mobile responsive and have the correct content, links and 
forms in place to enable supporters to garner more followers for the party. It is also 
valuable to see that in the case of a party such as the PA it does not help to have a 
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leader who only has a strong new media following, or is well known. There has to be 
a strong political party behind a leader to ensure that they have a successful campaign.  
 
There was a general inability, in all the parties involved in this research, to address the 
social group attachment described in Dalton’s (2014) writing. The parties and their 
leaders, with the exception of Agang and EFF, failed to positions themselves as either 
strongly conservative or liberal. There is a problem in South Africa in that the voting 
population is very diverse. This forces the parties to split their message into many 
smaller targeted messages; or to present a vague singular message in the hope that it 
will resonate with South Africans in general.  
 
The ideal new media strategy to address this diverse voting population would begin 
by pinpointing the sub-groups identified by Dalton (2014). This would enable the 
parties to execute a much more focused communication strategy, through the power 
of targeted online advertising and new media. Engaging directly with these predefined 
sub-groups, the parties would be in a strong position to send relevant messages that 
aligned with the groups’ specific ideals and needs.  
 
What was also quite interesting was the way in which “New Politics” (Dalton, 2014) 
was used. The recent post-apartheid history of elections in South Africa is geared 
strongly towards parties supporting issues such as multiculturalism, gender equality, 
environmental protection and staying away from overt religious alignments. This 
means that even though most of the parties identified could be seen as having a “New 
Party” mentality, in reality the parties are very middle-of-the-road and all focus on 
similar issues. This is where the EFF stood out with its very pro-nationalism rhetoric 
that clearly placed it in another camp.  
 
The limitations of this study are that it relied heavily on the data that was captured 
from the Twitter platform. Ideally there should be more sources to work with to 
ensure that a more holistic view of the parties and their leaders can be given.  
 
The quality of the communication that was sent out can also be improved 
considerably. Currently there is a big focus on the number of messages – be they 
tweets, Facebook posts or media articles that are posted online – but the parties do not 
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focus on what these messages said, how they were constructed or how they were 
received or perceived. This study is limited because it was a quantitative study and it 
could not analyse the quality of the content that was posted on the new media 
platforms. This means that the parties that have the most active new media profiles, in 
sheer numbers of tweets or posts, will be presented as having a better strategy; 
whereas in reality a party that does not tweet or post as much, but creates valuable and 
relevant content, should be weighted more positively because of it.  
 
Another limitation was that a predefined set of parties and leaders were followed, 
which limited the quality of analysis that could be done. In future studies there should 
be an expanded list of profiles followed and only after the election should the refined 
list be selected. This will ensure that outlier parties and personalities that do well or 
unexpectedly poorly in the elections are tracked and can be reported on. 
 
Areas for future research are thus: 
 
1. New media clearly has the ability, in a society where there is a large enough 
online audience, to impact directly on the outcome of an election. With this in 
mind, and the trend seen above regarding online penetration growth and the 
EFF’s success, is there not a foreseeable possibility of the EFF becoming the 
main opposition or even the leading party by the next national election in 
South Africa? 
 
2. New media clearly has an impact on elections, but there is currently no way to 
accurately measure its impact in an election in South Africa. There is thus 
room to create an empirical framework that other researchers can use to 
determine the impact new media has on an election. 
 
3. Currently, party funding is biased towards the incumbent. How will party 
funds be utilised and dispersed among parties if new media is more or less free 
or very cheap and should funding for traditional forms of media then not 
increase for parties that fare poorly?  How democratic is this?	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